University of Northern Iowa

UNI ScholarWorks
Honors Program Theses

Honors Program

2008

Social politics and freedom: Incorporating civil society into
Arendt's political thought
Grant J. Rozeboom
University of Northern Iowa

Let us know how access to this document benefits you
Copyright © 2008 Grant J. Rozeboom
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/hpt
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Rozeboom, Grant J., "Social politics and freedom: Incorporating civil society into Arendt's political
thought" (2008). Honors Program Theses. 18.
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/hpt/18

This Open Access Honors Program Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Program at
UNI ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Program Theses by an authorized administrator of
UNI ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uni.edu.

SOCIAL POLITICS AND FREEDOM:
INCORPORATING CIVIL SOCIETY INTO ARENDT’S POLITICAL THOUGHT

A Thesis
Submitted
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Designation
University Honors

Grant J. Rozeboom
University of Northern Iowa
May 2008

ABSTRACT:
The possibility of human freedom has captivated philosophers throughout the
ages, often leading them to conclude that freedom is a unique capacity of humanity,
exemplifying our potential for politics, contemplation, and/or religious salvation. In the
modern age, beginning with the political writings of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke,
freedom has been understood (at least within the early liberal tradition and common
discourse) as unhindered and individuated economic movement, motivated by selfinterest and actualized most fully in institutions such as the consumerist free market. Yet,
we find that the more we devote our actions to fulfilling our individual interests and
needs, the more our actions become subservient to physical/emotional impulses, leaving
one to wonder how freedom can be found in these apparently necessitated activities.
Hannah Arendt’s political theory, which draws on her personal experience of
totalitarianism in Europe and her understanding of Greek culture and thought, offers a
profoundly different and, in my estimation, superior understanding of freedom. It is not in
individual, economic action that we find human freedom, but rather in the discursive and
action-based associations we form with others. Thus, freedom is an essentially political
phenomenon, and depends upon the willingness of humans to form public identities
through their communal interactions with one another.
This project first undertakes a critique of the conventional understanding of
freedom by means of an analysis of the early liberal tradition’s attempts at defining
freedom. I in turn formulate a novel definition of freedom based upon Arendt’s work in

The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition, On Revolution, and Between Past
and Future.
Secondly, I will discuss the ways in which humans have lost their freedom in the
modern age through an analysis of consumerism. Utilizing Arendt’s formulation of the
“social realm,” I will explore how conformist and economically-functional behavior
characterizes a realm of human activity which is fundamentally anti-political and,
therefore, destructive towards freedom. Additionally, through my response to Hanna
Pitkin’s critique of Arendt in Attack of the Blob, I will defend Arendt’s use of the social
realm as both a relevant critique of the modern age and a prescient conceptual category,
further suggesting that the phenomenon of megachurches evidences her related claims.
Finally, I will utilize the tradition of civil society theorists beginning with Alexis
de Tocqueville (Democracy in America) and continuing with Jean Cohen and Andrew
Arato to describe the specific type(s) of activities that will facilitate freedom within our
own consumerist context. I will conclude by arguing that my concept of civil society fits
within Arendt’s political framework (although she never explicitly dealt with the topic),
focusing primarily upon her discussion of “social” forms of politics; most notable among
these is Thomas Jefferson’s “ward system.” Such a move on my part is justified by
drawing a nexus between the kind of freedom attributed to “civil society” in On
Revolution with the way in which freedom is developed by Arendt in The Human
Condition and other political writings. An Arendtian civil society, then, is not merely
another, “more-friendly” form of politics, but rather ought to be viewed as the bearer of
the conditions for freedom in our time.

I. FREEDOM BEYOND RESTRAINT:
An Arendtian Critique of the Early Liberal Tradition
Man cannot be free if he does not know that he is subject to necessity, because his freedom
is always won in his never wholly successful attempts to liberate himself from necessity.
– Hannah Arendt
How we define human freedom is inextricably related to the expectations we
attribute to our political and social orders, for we treat freedom as an ideal which ought to
be preserved, sought after, and shared by all members of our communities. Take, for
example, the common understanding of freedom, which can be traced to some of the
earliest formulations of liberal political thought and generally understands freedom as
unhindered, individual movement, motivating this movement from economic self-interest.
“Freedom” thus has been most fully actualized in institutions such as the consumerist free
market, within which persons are encouraged to gratify their desires for commodities and
profit in an unimpeded manner. Yet, a strange paradox arises if this unhindered “motion
within the body of a man”1 is the culmination of our freedom. For, it seems to me, the
degree to which we give sway to our individual desires and needs is also the degree to
which our actions are made to be subservient to those appetitive impulses and is, therefore,
the extent to which those actions are devoid of freedom.
Shall we say, then, that all hope for human freedom is lost? The answer must be
“yes,” unless we are willing to move beyond the individualistic presuppositions that are
expressed first in the beginnings of the liberal tradition. In the following paper, I will
justify such a move through my critique of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. While far
from comprehensive, this critical analysis will serve the purpose of demonstrating the
conventional understanding of freedom, insofar as it is rooted in Hobbesian and/or
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Lockean thought, to be both incoherent and undesirable.2 I will go from there to argue for a
notion of freedom that is grounded in the theoretical categories of Hannah Arendt, who, in
her description of politics and freedom, was able to discern crucial linkages between the
polis of ancient Athens and the “public happiness”3 of America’s Founders. This kind of
freedom is capable of breaking the shackles of individuated self-interest through the
formulation of common goods and public identities, and thus relies upon the differentiation
of private and public ways of living. Hanna Pitkin, a respected Arendt scholar, has accused
Arendt of being exclusivist and unjust on this point, claiming that the poor are effectively
banished from politics in Arendt’s theoretical system.4 In order to rectify this common
misunderstanding and defend the careful distinctions drawn by Arendt, I will include a
response to Pitkin within my discussion of Arendt’s “public freedom.” Furthermore, I will
use James Mensch’s phenomenological interpretation of Arendt’s writings to delineate the
ways in which public relationships facilitate this freedom through the formation of public
identities and the presentation of novel possibilities.5 Such an exclusively public definition
of freedom demands some guarantee of security for its citizens, and so I will conclude with
an argument for the political significance of promises and forgiveness using Arendt’s
explication of Jesus of Nazareth’s political thought.6
I
- LIBERTY in the EARLY LIBERAL TRADITION: HOBBES and LOCKE In the wake of the paradigm-shifting discoveries of Galileo and his “new science”
of matter in motion, Thomas Hobbes’ political theory emerged as a concerted effort to
explain human nature in terms of physical laws and principles. What Galileo had done with
inanimate objects and mathematical formulas, Hobbes attempted to do with human
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behavior and his State of Nature thought experiment. Accordingly, Hobbes’ political
thought can be seen as a project to reduce the vast complex of human life and interaction to
physical laws and the movement they govern. The result is a depiction of humans as
creatures subject to the influences of Appetite and Aversion, which act as “small
beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in … visible actions.”7
Consequently, in our “natural condition,” Hobbes imagined that humans live as isolated
seekers of self-preservation, for, as individuals, we can do no more than pursue the
fulfillment of our pressing physical desires. A strange sort of “equality of hope in the
attaining of our ends” is achieved in this state of affairs, as is a vicious enmity among all
persons: as we cross each others’ paths, we will inevitably impede each others’ pursuits of
self-interest.8 Therefore, since frustration and violence are bound to occur when persons
are prevented from pursuing their physical desires, freedom can mean nothing more than
“the absence of [these] external impediments.”9 Just as a ball placed on a downward slope
will continue rolling freely in the same direction until some sort of obstacle is placed in its
path, so will humans carry on with their chase after appetite’s objects until some hindrance
is placed before them.
Freedom, then, simply describes the way in which humans conduct themselves
prior to meeting one another and is, therefore, only existent in individuals who are quite
literally left to their own devices. It is not an ideal worth striving towards, and it certainly
does not warrant much political concern. In fact, once persons are willing to form a
political community (Hobbes used to the term “Commonwealth”), freedom is immediately
and necessarily lost, for with the security offered by a government comes “impediments”
in the form of laws and public obligations. Any freedom that remains after the formation of
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this Social Contract is therefore private and/or economic: “the liberty to buy, and sell, and
otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own
trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.”10
Much could be said towards the disparagement of Hobbes’ vicious and despotic
political system, but my critique will remain focused on his notion of freedom. The ways
in which Hobbes describes the freedom of pre-political persons in the State of Nature and
of subjects in the Commonwealth are plagued with a common limitation, one that is quite
troubling and in the following passage is acknowledged by Hobbes himself:
“Liberty, and necessity are consistent: as in the water, that hath not only
liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel; so likewise in the
actions which men voluntarily do: which, because they proceed from their
will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of man’s will …
proceedeth from some cause … they proceed from necessity.”11
Because persons are “naturally” unhindered in their attempts to satisfy biological desires
sprung from “their will,” Hobbes detects an element of freedom in all human action. And
yet, because of his insistence on reducing human behavior to physical laws and logical
formulas, he must also admit to a pervasive sense of necessity – or, to use a different term,
determinism – within his analysis of human behavior, as well. Credit may be given to
Hobbes for admitting this perplexity, but his attempt to resolve it by appealing to “God,
that seeth, and disposeth all things”12 seems of little help for our purposes. There is an
inevitable paradox in calling free those actions whose end is the satisfaction of bodily
needs, for the fulfillment of physical needs is never a matter of freedom. Rather, we must
take the word “need” to imply those desires and impulses which act as masters over us,
punishing us with discomfort or pain until we take the necessary action to assuage them.
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To begin a definition of freedom within these circumstances of predetermined needs is
therefore quite odd and self-defeating.
In his Second Treatise of Government, John Locke followed the methodology of
Hobbes by constructing a systematic political theory based upon the description of
humankind in an imagined natural existence – the State of Nature. However, unlike
Hobbes, Locke did not attempt to reduce human action to predictable, physical principles;
rather, his overarching focus was private property and the protection thereof, and all other
aspects of his political theory (including freedom) are properly seen as subordinate in
comparison. Consider Locke’s State of Nature, which is “a state of perfect freedom” only
because persons can “dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit.”13 Here,
what is most significant is the absence of external authority that can lawfully constrain
humans from fully enjoying their property. Furthermore, Locke inserts one crucial proviso
to this natural freedom through his explication of the Law of Nature: “Though man in [the
State of Nature] have an uncontrolable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet
he has not liberty to destroy himself.”14 With this, another demonstration of the primacy of
private property is seen through an argument for its status as a “natural” right. Locke
places the origin of property is within each individual’s body and affords it protection in
the State of Nature through the universal enforcement of the Law of Nature, a universal
maxim that acts as an across-the-board prohibition of self-destruction. This results in the
absolute and inalienable protection of property’s most basic and natural form – the human
body. Thus, the development of the Law of Nature allowed Locke to formulate private
property as a necessary political principle without compromising its pre-political quality in
the State of Nature.

5

To Locke, the laboring process also is fundamental and prior to any understanding
of freedom, since laboring is the activity by which persons extend their bodies (the
elemental form of property) into nature in order to obtain more property.15 Freedom, then,
can be understood as an internal capacity which simply functions alongside labor for the
acquisition of external forms of property, and is defined both positively and negatively by
Locke. First, economic autonomy emerges positively through the self-directed ordering of
one’s own property, for, as previously mentioned, persons are free when they “order their
actions, and dispose of their possessions and person as they see fit.” Secondly, in order for
Locke’s laborers to exist freely, they must be unhindered (and therefore isolated) in their
acquisition of property. This is implied by Locke with the phrase “as they see fit,” and is
negative insofar as it emphasizes a lack of external interference (e.g. greedy neighbors,
overreaching state authority, etc.). Both aspects of this freedom are most fully realized
when persons are allowed to labor and obtain possessions for themselves and their families
with as little interruption as possible, and consequently, freedom itself is a form of
property to be preserved and enjoyed. Accordingly, it can be taken and/or destroyed, and
thus warrants defense: “Man … hath by nature a power … to preserve his property, that is,
his life, liberty, and estate”16 (emphasis added).
Ultimately, Locke constructs his theory of governance around a Social Contract
analogous to Hobbes’, but with one important distinction. Locke considers the voluntary
consent of all persons to be governed as the key to rightful political authority.17 Since
persons naturally have absolute, free reign over their bodies and the possessions they
acquire, the formation of a Commonwealth necessitates the voluntary surrender of this
private rule. In return, citizens expect their government to protect their property through
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the institution and enforcement of laws. As a result, the government which is formed
through Locke’s Social Contract is continually dependent on the willingness of a majority
of its subjects to remain constrained by its laws, and therefore, a considerable amount of
freedom is retained by Commonwealth citizens in the forms of economic autonomy and
unhindered labor. However, should they ever wish to fully realize this freedom, they must
jointly dissolve their Commonwealth (by majority decision) and reenter the State of
Nature,18 which promises no external protection of their property, but allows propertyacquisition to occur in an unhindered and unending manner.
Locke was well aware of the troublesome conclusions drawn in Hobbes’ political
theory, and therefore, his emphasis on governance by consent alone can be seen as an
attempt to avoid the potentially abusive tyranny of Hobbes’ Sovereign. However, a fatal
flaw arises in Locke’s theoretical treatment of freedom, and it stems from his suggestion
that freedom is equivalent to the unimpeded enjoyment of property. The question must be
asked: What, if anything, should be done about those cases in which some persons freely
enjoy excessive amounts of property at the expense of others who have little or none?
Ought there be an attempt to alleviate this disparity, so as to ensure a more politically
egalitarian experience of freedom? While Locke briefly considers the problem of slavery in
Chapter IV of the Second Treatise, his theory falls short of arguing for the political
protection of persons who must sell their labor to the wealthy for a nominal wage. For if
they voluntarily toil each day for an agreed upon wage, and if this wage allows them to
buy the bare necessities of life, then, using Locke’s premises, we would have to conclude
that these persons maintain their freedom. What little property they have in the form of
body, labor, and money, they are able to order “as they see fit,” and therefore, no action on
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their behalf is required. Locke would also claim that an exploitive economic relationship,
of the kind just described, existent within the secure bounds of the Commonwealth is far
better than the anarchic, interpersonal freedom offered by the State of Nature.19 Yet, how
can we conclude that lives which are filled with days of hard labor and just enough food
and sleep to survive are lives of freedom? As previously mentioned, activities dedicated to
survival are inherently un-free; they are deeds done because their performance is
necessitated by biological forces beyond human control. Therefore, by limiting the purpose
of freedom to mere property-preservation, and thereby reducing freedom to a form of
property, Locke’s theory allows for the same untenable conclusion embraced by Hobbes:
that it is possible for there to be a predominance of necessity in actions that are, at the same
time, supposedly free.
II
- ATHENS, ARENDT, and the DISCOVERY of AUTHENTIC FREEDOM For Hannah Arendt, the discovery of freedom began long before the modern age
and the prevalence of economic individualism. She looked to the Ancient Greeks and their
understanding of politics to discover what was “lost” from popular notions of freedom, and
discovered a fundamental contrast between life in the household (oikos) and life as a
citizen in the city-state (polis).20 Within the Greek household, the needs of the body and
other survival concerns, such as reproduction, were properly dealt with. Every individual
within this structure, with the despotes as ruler on top and women, children, and slaves as
the ruled below, was positioned so as to ensure the propagation of the human species.
Accordingly, persons within the private sphere of the household were defined primarily by
their survival and/or economic function, so that women were known as child-bearers,
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slaves were known as laborers, men as household heads, etc. Directly opposed to this needdriven realm was the polis and its offer of citizenship.21 By creating a space in which
despōtai could shed their functional, household role, and interact with one another as equal
citizens, the polis birthed the possibility of human action detached from necessity. 22 As
citizens began to deliberate with one another and join together on behalf of their
community, they spoke and acted in ways that were not predetermined by biological
instinct, but instead were unpredictable and therefore constantly “beginning something
anew.”23 Instead of remaining trapped within necessitated oikos roles, Athenian citizens
discovered the possibility of public identity in political action, and in doing so, displayed
the essence of human freedom.
A distinction should be drawn here, so that Arendt’s allusion to Greek institutions
in her formulation of freedom is not mistaken for an “irresponsible nostalgia for the days
of Pericles’ Athens.”24 Her admiration for Athenian politics was limited to the theoretical
basis it provided for defining freedom as a public, interpersonal, and communal concept,
and did not extend to the institutions that left women and slaves powerless and exploited:
“The price for the elimination of life’s burden from the shoulders of all [Athenian] citizens
was enormous and by no means consisted only in the violent injustice of forcing one part
of humanity into the darkness of pain and necessity.”25 Therefore, when attempting to
extract a definition of freedom from Arendt’s writings, one must be careful to separate her
own thoughts from her references to Greek thought and culture. This means that, while
Arendt considered the polis to be significant for understanding freedom because it
represented the possibility of public self-revelation and joint action, her theory has no
special attachment to the polis as a historical or practical form of political organization.26
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Similarly, Arendt’s references to Athenian citizenship are significant only because they
describe the building of public relationships that can facilitate the discovery of public
identities and action apart from household needs.27
Arendt further explicated the way in which freedom is opposed to necessitated
behavior through her comparison of the American and French Revolutions. She
distinguished between liberation, which characterized the French Revolution and focused
on relieving persons from economic impoverishment and oppression, with the genuine
political revolution that took place in America, which sought “the foundation of freedom
and the establishment of lasting institutions.”28 Since the French Revolution became
“overwhelmed by the cares and worries which actually belonged in the sphere of the
household,”29 it allowed biological necessity to dictate the outcome of public interactions,
thereby excluding the possibility of freedom from politics. The persons empowering and
leading the French Revolution concerned themselves exclusively with the masses’ “cry for
bread,” and therefore individual needs acted with “one will” to impose private, household
functions on the public assembly; in turn, politicians were forced to act as members of one
family instead of as unique citizens.30 In contrast, the founders of the American Revolution
devoted themselves to constructing a lasting polity, and therefore “remained men of action
from beginning to end.”31 By keeping the concerns of human community, and not human
survival, as chief among their purposes, the “men of the American Revolution” preserved
the possibility of citizenship, and successfully crafted a document which was intended to
perpetuate freedom for hundreds of years to come. Thus, just as the Ancient Greek oikos
was devoted to private, economic concerns and therefore was incompatible with the polis
and its promise of freedom, the French Revolution was defined by its concerted effort to
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address individual, physical needs, and therefore acted as the negative counterpart of the
American Revolution which relied upon the joint action of citizens in public places for its
political success.
Arendt’s account of politics and freedom in On Revolution is oft criticized for
being passive towards the plight of the poor. Hanna Pitkin, for example, accuses Arendt of
being “highly ambiguous” and fundamentally unjust in her political writings.32 Pitkin
suggests that, because Arendt attributed the failure of the French Revolution to its leaders’
single-minded effort to remedy the problem of poverty, Arendt’s notion of freedom
supports the “exclusion of the exploited by their exploiters,” and, in doing so, makes
politics nonsensical.33 By relegating economics to the private realm and reviving the
Ancient Greek concept of public glory, Pitkin finds that Arendt replaces the competition of
the marketplace with a competition for public recognition, and thereby transformed
citizenship into the struggle for political fame.34 Accordingly, Pitkin describes the
government which results from Arendtian citizenship as “a traditional and quite offhand
invocation of the theory of social contract. Each [citizen] sees his private advantage in
being joined to others.”35 In other words, since Pitkin views Arendt’s treatment of the
French Revolution as indifferent towards poverty, she concludes that economic selfinterest has no place in Arendtian politics, but then assumes that some other form of
egoism must still be present. She discovers this in the form of hubris, and accordingly
describes Arendt’s ideal citizens as nothing more than self-interested individuals pursuing
public glory at all costs, even if it means ignoring the condition of the poor. Consequently,
Pitkin finds that Arendt’s political philosophy is sorely lacking a concept of justice, and
therefore is self-defeating in its attempts to promote freedom and genuine political
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relationships in the public realm.36 By refusing to admit the poor masses of the French
Revolution into the space of politics and freedom, Arendt denied the possibility of action
on behalf of genuine common interests, for common interests must include the troubles
created by the existence of poverty. Pitkin therefore suggests that we link private economic
concerns with public affairs so that the plight of the impoverished can be addressed, and
we can better understand how “we are all in fact members of one another.”37
The implications of Pitkin’s critique are devastating towards any attempt to apply
Arendt’s political theory. How could we accept a definition of political freedom that
carries with it the great injustice of excluding the poor from political consideration? Yet, a
critical examination of Pitkin’s account reveals crucial misunderstandings that betray her
conclusions, and these can be summarized with her statement, “Arendt is highly
ambiguous about whether freedom and action are possible in private, or only in the public
realm.”38 Arendt is painstakingly clear in all of her political writings that freedom is an
exclusively public principle: “[Freedom demands] a common public space,”39 and again,
“Without a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make
its appearance.”40 By suggesting otherwise, Pitkin apparently misunderstands the very
foundation on which Arendt builds her definition of freedom. Additionally, it is this
misrepresentation of Arendt’s notion of freedom that leads Pitkin to conclude, among other
things, that Arendt is unsympathetic towards the issues of poverty and justice. Rather than
attempting to exclude an entire class of persons from government, Arendt was greatly
concerned with the preservation of a realm of freedom that could function properly only if
all persons are potential participants: “For political freedom, generally speaking, means the
right ‘to be a participator in government’, or it means nothing.”41 Certainly, Arendt’s
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discussion of the role of poverty in the French Revolution could be characterized as
careless, insofar as it fails to clarify ways in which impoverished persons can become
citizens, but this should not be taken to mean that Arendt wished to deny poor persons
access to citizenship (this will be discussed further in Chapter II). On the contrary,
Arendt’s focus in On Revolution, as well as in The Human Condition, is “the indictment of
an activity, a way of life, even of a relationship to the world, but not of a social class”42
(emphasis added). In other words, Arendt considered activities of necessity, and not the
persons participating in those activities, as the real danger facing politics and freedom. By
becoming active members of a polity, any person is able to move beyond necessitated
deeds and experience freedom.
Furthermore, Arendt’s portrayal of this citizenship is not reminiscent of
individualistic Social Contract theories, as Pitkin would suggest, but instead is entirely
dependent upon the cooperation of persons working towards common objectives.43 For
Arendt, this occurs through public action and speech, which serve the purpose of revealing
political agents to one another and thereby establish relationships which can facilitate the
interchange of ideas and joint action for the execution of these ideas.44 Action and speech
are the two essential activities of citizens, and are possible only when “people are with
others and neither for nor against them.”45 Once again, Arendt invokes Athenian politics
by discussing the dual meaning the Greeks attached to the verb “to act (praxis).” Archein
means “to begin” or “to lead,” and was used to imply the formulation and initiation of a
plan of action. Prattein means “to finish,” and implied the actual implementation of the
beginner’s idea.46 Together, these two concepts described the result of citizens speaking
with one another on behalf of their community, and then jointly choosing a path of praxis
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they thought best. Having dealt with the needs of survival within their households, citizens
relished this opportunity to experience freedom through politics. Accordingly, Arendtian
citizenship strives for the type of community that can facilitate free action among its
members, and therefore seeks to provide a space for the building of relationships apart
from the functional roles of necessity.
We can safely conclude, then, that a large portion of Arendt’s political project is
dedicated to demonstrating that freedom is a reality available to all humans through
politics. No group of persons deserves to be left out of polity life, for its very existence
implies its potential universality. Conversely, as soon as classes of persons are
systematically prevented from taking part in politics, freedom for all persons begins to
deteriorate. Since Arendtian citizenship centers on exchanges between persons in the
public realm, and since it is only through these exchanges that common purposes are
revealed, the loss of community members from the political realm means a decrease in the
potential number of public relationships, and, more importantly, a decrease in the number
of potential political deeds, which are our only means to experiencing freedom. Therefore,
for Arendt, freedom can be defined broadly as follows: the appearing quality of actions
that are dedicated to the construction and sustenance of a political community. It is quite
unreasonable to conclude, then, that Arendt would support an egoistic and exclusivist
political system, for such a government would make her explanations of freedom and
citizenship impossible to comprehend.
III
- PUBLIC IDENTITY and the POLITICS OF JESUS -
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The fundamental problem posed by liberal definitions of freedom, as previously
discussed, is that predetermined desires and influences remain prevalent in acts which are
supposed to be free. Individuals experience freedom, according to Hobbes and Locke,
when they are unhindered in their ability to order their bodies and their possessions. The
more isolated persons become in their pursuit of self-interest, the less likely they are to be
impeded in this pursuit, and therefore, the more complete their experience of freedom
becomes. Yet, using Arendt’s categories, we find that the more isolated we are from others,
the more confined we become to activities of necessity. The “perfect,” isolated freedom of
early liberals means nothing more than a life devoted to household, oikia needs, for there is
nothing to meet us in our solitude other than the pressing needs and wants of our bodies.
These desires, in turn, reduce our actions to mere functions of biological necessity, and
soon we find our lives limited to the functional roles created by physical hungers. That is
to say, actions that have as their primary end the satiation of bodily needs are
fundamentally functional towards those ends, and thus, the lives of persons engaging in
these types of activities can best be described by the functional roles created by the
purposes of their survival. Therefore, it is my proposal that we consider the public identity
found in Arendtian citizenship as the proper remedy to the physical functionality which
plagues liberal formulations of freedom.47 And in order to explain this more fully, I turn to
James Mensch’s phenomenological interpretation of Arendt’s writings.
Mensch carefully examines Arendt’s related statements that “in the realm of human
affairs, being and appearance are indeed one and the same,”48 and that “freedom consists of
‘words and deeds which are meant to appear, whose very existence hinges on
appearance.’”49 He suggests that what is behind these claims is the recognition of
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freedom’s dependence upon the “excessive” number of possibilities presented by persons
to each other through public relationships.50 In other words, as I form public connections
with others (that is, relationships which must appear in public), I am made aware of new
perspectives and possibilities that lift my gaze from private necessity to shared values and
interests. In doing so, I learn that I, too, can reveal new ideas, and therefore I begin to
embrace the possibility of a public identity. Public identity can be defined, then, as the
personality we learn to embody in our public relations with others, based upon the
expectations which result from speaking and acting with them. It counteracts the
confinement of private functional roles by revealing the possibility of action beyond the
fulfillment of individual needs, and is therefore fundamentally free; as such, it “springs
from … possibilities always exceeding its expression.”51 Since biological needs are
predetermined, household roles exclude novel experiences, whereas public identities
depend upon the discovery of the novel views of others and therefore establish freedom
through the presentation of perspectives distinct from those created by private concerns.
Additionally, identity-formation is a mutually constructive process that removes humans
from solitude, for it is only when we speak and act with others that we learn the words and
deeds of which our own public personalities consist: “In acting and speaking, men show
who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their
appearance in the human world.”52 Accordingly, since an inexhaustible source of potential
actions exists within the relationships of a political community, an element of
unpredictability is present in this definition of public life. Here, the future is unknown, and
the plurality of citizens’ identities ensures that new possibilities will never be in short
supply.53

16

At first glance, it seems as though this account of freedom is chaotic and
overwhelming, as the innumerable ideas and possibilities which “spring from” citizens’
interactions collide and combine in an unpredictable manner. Mensch’s and, accordingly,
Arendt’s response to this objection lies with the security found in public promises. As
persons reveal themselves through their public interactions and face the uncertain future of
politics, promises bind these citizens “to the performance of an action,”54 and therefore act
as “isolated islands in an ocean of uncertainty.”55 Promises ensure that persons will remain
consistent to their publicly proclaimed identities so that the selfish needs of privacy will
not be allowed to creep into public discourse and action. Without promises, persons would
be unable to determine how to interact with one another in public, for they would have no
reason to believe that the “appearance” of others was an accurate representation of their
public “being” (that is, their actual beliefs, attitudes, and intentions concerning the future
of their community). Furthermore, by making the commitment to only speak and act in
ways that reflect the self which I have already revealed to others, I free these others from
having to discern my secret thoughts and plans, and thus enable them to join with me in
continuing to explore new possibilities for our community.
It is at this point Mensch’s insistence on maintaining a notion of “individual
freedom”56 becomes unsustainable. He suggests that private and public freedom are
“irredeemably entangled,”57 and yet, he also acknowledges that persons must be
wholeheartedly committed to their public identities (through the act of promising) in order
for freedom to exist. In other words, it seems as though he wishes to maintain the seeming
refuge of an inner, private realm of freedom while still striving to construct a public space
for citizens to experience freedom together. One must wonder how persons can experience
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freedom within themselves if it is supposed to result from relationships, interactions, and
speech that – above all else – must appear in public. By Mensch’s own admission, the
“nature of public freedom” is “grounded by the appearing of others, [and] its expression is
always in terms of a context.”58 Any freedom apart from this drives persons back into
isolation and necessity, for, without experiencing public connections to others, the
unending possibilities of joint action eventually disappear, as individuals have nothing new
to reveal or begin with themselves. Furthermore, if we allow ourselves to retreat into this
privacy for the sake of freedom,59 we compromise our public commitment to maintain the
honest appearance of our identities. That is to say, if freedom can originate within
individuals, it implies that our identities, which are required for freedom to emerge, can be
revealed without the presence of others and therefore be partially or completely hidden
from them. This would undermine the integrity and consistency required to facilitate joint
action and agreement among citizens, for (as previously mentioned) without being able to
trust the appearance of others’ identities as honest and complete, I cannot commit to join
with them on behalf of our community.
The question may be raised: What is to be done, then, if persons are not able to
achieve perfection in the performance of their public identities? Surely we cannot demand
that the revelation of political personalities happens without error. Initially, this objection
may seem to imply the need to reinstate some concept of private freedom, so that when our
public attempts at freedom fail, either due to our own mistakes or because of the mishaps
of others, we can rely upon ourselves to find some sort of freedom in personal pursuits and
pleasures. However, in light of the previous discussion concerning the incompatibility of
freedom with privacy, I suggest that we turn instead to the political implications of
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forgiveness, which Arendt attributes to Jesus of Nazareth.60 According to Arendt,
forgiveness allows persons to remain citizens even in the midst of their imperfections
because it constantly releases them “from what they have done unknowingly.”61 By
forgiving each other, we acknowledge that public identities will be compromised from
time to time, and that we cannot hold each other to these lapses, otherwise “everyone
remains bound to the process [of vengeance].” Freedom disappears when persons engage
in this continual retribution for past wrongs, for nothing new can be shared or done if all
acts are focused on past transgressions, and so forgiveness is needed to protect the future
possibility of political action. Herein lies the power of Jesus’ politics: that as we commit to
venture beyond the secure bounds of private necessity, and found freedom through the
mutual revelation of our public identities, we also agree to forgive each other for incidental
wrongdoing. In doing so, we eliminate the fear of public reprisal that could prevent us
from engaging in genuine citizenship. “The freedom contained in Jesus’ teachings of
forgiveness is the freedom from vengeance,”62 and therefore is also the same freedom that
must appear in public through the relationships of citizens.
By invoking the phrase, “Jesus’ politics,” I in no way mean to suggest some sort of
theocratic ideal, or that one particular religious tradition should come to bear influence on
politics and governance.63 I simply intend to argue for the public importance of
forgiveness, as suggested by Jesus’ teachings and applied by Arendt’s political thought.
Forgiveness as a political concept needs no theological justification, for its significance lies
in its ability to preserve citizenship. It allows human appearance in the public realm to
transcend inevitable inconsistencies and mistakes, and therefore encourages the firm
embrace of public identities that are lasting and trustworthy. Consequently, with the
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stability derived from public promises and the security guaranteed by public forgiveness,
we have the tools needed to facilitate public interactions that counter the necessity of
private needs and wants, while still possessing the endurance needed to maintain a full and
vibrant freedom that needs no restraint.
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II. THE LOSS of FREEDOM in the MODERN AGE:
Arendt’s Social Realm and American Consumerism
Here, where the deed itself dispossesses us of all power, we can indeed only repeat with
Jesus: ‘It were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into
the sea.’ – Hannah Arendt
In order to better understand the freedom defined by Arendt’s political writings, we
ought to examine those conceptual conditions which negate this freedom by their very
existence. That is, by analyzing the type of socio-political order which is directly opposed
to the emergence of freedom, we should be better equipped to conceive of ways to view
human activity for the purpose of recognizing its potentially free components. In order to
do this, I will explicate Arendt’s notion of “the social realm,” insofar as it served to
contrast and bound her ideal of politics or “the political realm,” which, for Arendt, is the
exclusive location of freedom. Additionally, I will attempt to clarify Arendt’s use of the
terms “realm” and “space” for the sake of avoiding the common ambiguities that arise
when philosophers employ these words. Next, I will address Hanna Pitkin’s critique of
Arendt’s use of the social realm as a philosophical category, in which Pitkin claims that
Arendt is far too ambiguous and abstract when dealing with “the social.” Pitkin suggests,
in turn, that the value of Arendt’s work lies in its call for individuals to take hold of their
potential for action and not be frozen by conformist and economic social strictures. While
hopeful in its tone, Pitkin’s work is highly misleading when considered against the totality
of Arendt’s political project. Therefore, I will respond by defending Arendt’s designation
of “the social” as a concept that is by definition devoid of the potential for both politics and
freedom; this is due to the social realm’s fundamental embodiment of functional,
behavioral acts.
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In doing so, I will also acknowledge that Arendt’s attempt to exclude what she
deemed “social” matters (i.e. poverty, housing for the poor) from politics is unsustainable
and inconsistent with her definition of freedom. Freedom is not, as she herself admitted,
the escape from necessitated activity, but can only come when persons join together for the
purpose of forming a community within which all can discover their unique identity. This
creation of public personalities cannot occur if certain issues, such as poverty, are banned
outright from political forums, for an essential part of political speech and action is the
decision to include or exclude matters introduced by individual citizens. 1 Whether or not
these problems are of political significance is a decision for citizens and their respective
polities, not political philosophers. Thus, while Arendt’s differentiation of the private,
social, and political realms is highly valuable for understanding the type of activities which
foster (as well as destroy) genuine politics and freedom, her attempt to correlate specific
acts, issues, and spaces with these categorical activities is confusing and distracts from her
more significant assertion: that American consumerism is an example of a cancerous form
of the social realm which threatens, by its spread, to subsume all human activities within
functional roles. Finally, I will conclude by illustrating the prescience of this claim through
a critical analysis of the megachurch phenomenon, which, in my estimation, is the most
astounding manifestation of consumerist society in recent times.
I
- A DEFINITION of CONCEPTUAL REALMS Perhaps no other idea or argument made by Arendt has been the subject of so much
scholarly controversy – granting exception to the “banality of evil” – as her development
of the “social realm.” Therefore, in order to avoid treading into some of the unnecessary
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ambiguity which has often plagued these discussions, I first want to establish a clear
understanding of Arendt’s conceptual “realms” or “spaces” as terms, defending against
alternative interpretations and carefully clarifying their usage. This definition is based
firmly in the qualitative description of human action and is distinct from other common
uses, including the referencing of certain geographical locations, the categorization of
kinds of relationships, and/or the abstraction of historico-political institutions.
When using the word “realm” in everyday conversation, we often refer to
geographical-spatial domains, either literally or metaphorically. However, Arendt’s
employment of this term is neither figurative in the sense that it does not directly refer to
specific locations nor is its metaphorical meaning grounded in physical spaces. Rather, she
bases her discussion of realms in the description of certain kinds or types of human
actions. Consider her careful phrasing as she correlates the differentiation of the public and
private realms of the Ancient Greeks with the contrast between “activities related to a
common world and those [activities which are] related to the maintenance of life”2
(emphasis added). That is to say, Arendt’s idea of the public realm consists first and
foremost of activities that are devoted to the construction of a political community of
public identities and joint endeavors, and her coinciding notion of a “private sphere”
envelops those actions that are focused on the fulfillment of individual needs. Thus, we can
also infer that, for Arendt, these realms of activities are categorized according to their
diverging purposes, so that by referring to different kinds of activities we are, at the same
time, referring to activities done for different reasons. It is important to note here that
Arendt is not concerned with categorizing specific activities themselves i.e. she would not
insist that all forms of eating are in themselves functions of the private realm. What is
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significant for her is the attribution of purpose to activities, whatever actual form they may
take, so that if eating is done for the purpose of satisfying physical hunger, then she would
conclude that this consumption belongs to the private realm. Similarly, if, for some reason,
eating became a ritualized component of the participatory procedures in a hypothetical
polity, then Arendt’s framework would lead us to conclude that the public realm extends
around this eating activity. In fact, we can easily imagine a case in which localized forms
of politics take place within houses and/or small community buildings, lending themselves
to the incorporation of food and drink into their assembly activities.3
Unfortunately, Arendt’s decision to base her discussion of activity-spaces in the
Greek polis seemingly confounds this interpretation of her framework. First, the Greeks,
according to Arendt, viewed the public and the private as actual, spatial domains that
corresponded to the polis (and, more specifically, the agora) for the former and the oikia
for the latter.4 This is immediately problematic when one considers that ways of doing
activities are not necessarily correlative to places for the doing of those same activities.
That is to say, a private act, defined as a deed done for the purpose of satisfying a private
need, is therefore not inherently confined to households and could be done just as easily
(withstanding some scrutiny and discomfort) in the shining light of so-called “public
spaces.” Secondly, since the Athenian model of citizenship closely associated political
action with a group of privileged men, those who were allowed to leave their households
and partake in the assembly, and private activity with the women, children, and slaves who
were relegated to household functions, Arendt, in referencing the Greek polis, exposes
herself to the criticism that her use of realms is exclusive of certain groups of people.5 My
response to this accusation is delineated in the first chapter, and thus for now I will simply
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remind the reader of Arendt’s emphasis on types of activities and/or ways of doing,6
thereby neither excluding groups of persons nor referencing specific places and/or
domains. Despite her occasional inconsistencies, we can move on, then, reassured that
Arendt’s theoretical realms refer not to places or people but rather to the ways in which
humans engage in their various activities.
I willingly admit that the boundaries of these realms appear quite ambiguous at
times, calling into question their descriptive efficacy. Consider the case of a couple who,
over a cup of coffee and some blueberry scones, discusses the recent congressional election
at a local coffee shop. Their actions are, at the same time, potentially 1) private, insofar as
they are eating and drinking, and 2) public, insofar as they are partaking in dialogue which
raises their awareness of political concerns and governmental happenings. How can we
possibly apply the notion of realms in a useful manner in the numerous cases such as this,
in which the salient purpose of an activity is far from clear? The immediate answer seems
to lie in the notion of individual attitude or intention, so that the actor’s perspective or
privately perceived purpose of his or her action determines its qualitative description.
Thus, in this coffee shop example, we might say that if the couple intended to meet at the
coffee shop primarily to satisfy their morning hunger pains, and only incidentally engaged
in some political discussion, then their actions should fall under the category of the
“private realm,” and if they purposed their meeting for the consideration of public affairs,
and ate and drank only as a formality, then they partook in the words and deeds of
Arendt’s public realm.
However, difficulties arise if we allow our understanding of an activity’s purpose to
be determined solely by its actor’s attitude or intention (which, for our purposes, can be
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used interchangeably7). First, our intentions or attitudes about activities often change
between the moment we first intend a certain action and the conclusion of that action’s
execution, as the intended confrontation of a distant friend (“Why haven’t you called me
back yet?”) might transform into deliberate consolation once we learn of the tragic
circumstances that he or she faces (“I’m very sorry that your parents are splitting up”),
which in turn might change into charitable ministry after some egocentric reflection on
one’s own empathetic abilities (“I’m so glad I can help fix your emotional difficulty since
I’m quite good at helping others with their problems”). That is to say, given the continually
changing character of our interpersonal context and our continual adaptation to it based
upon the results of our interactions with others, hope for the identification of singular,
stable intentions seems in vain. Secondly, the nature of talk of “private intentions” is such
that we, as individual actors, are granted privileged access to the experience of our own
attitudes. Without delving into the many contemporary debates concerning the
phenomenon of intention and intentional attitudes, I will suggest only that, insofar as we
are concerned with differentiating kinds of activities that constitute commonly shared
“spaces” of words and deeds, the admission of private intentions as a descriptive factor of
human activity is a highly inconsistent move. How can we evaluate actions that are
supposedly characterized by the manner in which they appear before others – their
intersubjective quality – with a criterion rooted in subjective, individuated experience?
This would be to fall towards a peculiar form of relativism, wherein any individual’s selfdescription of their acts as “political” or “private” is sufficient for defining them as
instances of the “political” or “private” realm.
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How, then, are we to ascertain the purpose of actions, if not by the elusive
intentions and attitudes of their actors? We must turn once again to Arendt’s writings:
“In the realm of human affairs, being and appearance are indeed one and the same.”8 That
is to say, the essence or purpose of the activities occurring within “the realm of human
affairs” cannot be found in some hidden, individuated phenomena such as intention and
attitude but rather is discovered by examining how these activities appear before others.
Thus, while we cannot rely upon our attempts to discern the shadowy intentions and
attitudes of others and ourselves, we can consider an actor’s verbal account of his or her
action, along with our own observations of the action and/or the testimony of others, as
proper means for the end of determining an act’s purpose, for these are all means towards
intersubjectively experiencing the said act. They limit the scope of inquiry to the sorts of
phenomena that are shareable by multiple persons simultaneously and thus maintain
Arendt’s descriptive and, I would suggest, prescriptive charge that being and appearance
remain undifferentiated in human interactions.9 Furthermore, we ought to keep in mind the
relational, cultural, and socio-political context within which an activity takes place, so as to
include prior interactions, norms, cultural expectations, legal constraints, and the like as
vital parts of our analysis of a certain activity’s appearance. In my estimation, this is often
much simpler than it sounds, especially when dealing with actions done within one’s own
cultural context, for many of these contextual factors can be presumed without explicit
consideration. The result is what perhaps could be termed a “common attitude” towards
actions – the intersubjective designation of purpose to acts based upon their ongoing
appearance to others and their execution within a given context.
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I have one final clarification regarding the relationship between an action and its
purpose. Some might suggest that, while the notion of an intersubjective formulation of
purpose is all fine and good, the application of this procedure is impossible due to the
presence of an infinite regress within attempts to consider one – and only one – action at a
time. Consider again the example of a couple eating and conversing at a coffee shop – does
the one action consist of their entire meeting? Or does one action consist in the purchasing
of food, and another in the discussion? Or, perhaps, does the discussion itself consist of
multiple actions, based upon the shifting of conversation topics? Do individual sentences
count as acts, and if so, what about words? While alluring in its seeming cleverness, this
line of reasoning is entirely beside the point, for it presumes that activities should be
examined for some sort of intrinsic essence that is more clearly seen upon further
dissection. Arendt’s methodology is not to look “into” actions to expose their hidden
content but rather to take human activity as it appears and then apply the definitions
contained within her conceptual realms to these appearances; thus, an action’s duration is
constrained (and maintained) by the boundaries of those definitions that are applied to it,
preventing a lapse into the continual division of actions into smaller and smaller acts. In
other words, once an act’s appearance is conceivable within the conceptual definitions
given by our understanding of realms, its duration is sufficient for the application of the
realm’s categories, and further investigation is only necessary if the act’s appearance is too
complex to consider as a whole. To summarize this discussion, then: Arendt’s use of a
theoretical framework of realms implies the categorization of types of human actions, and
this in turn refers to the designation of purpose to actions (based upon the categories
entailed by the realms) through the intersubjective account of these actions’ appearances.
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II
- AGAINST the POLITICAL: ARENDT’S SOCIAL REALM Keeping these principles in mind, we can go on to examine Arendt’s formulation of
the social realm as a philosophical concept, primarily relying upon The Human Condition
to inform our discussion. However, since the political realm is more authentic to Arendt,10
preceding the rise of the social realm historically and theoretically presenting persons with
the opportunity to realize their potential for humanness,11 I will first address the ways in
which Arendt defines and describes activities that are essentially political. We will then be
able to see clearly the conceptual antagonism which emerges between her explication of
the political and social realms, keeping in mind that 1) the socio-political circumstances
detailed in The Origins of Totalitarianism serve as a backdrop to her work in The Human
Condition and 2) the ways in which On Revolution demonstrated Arendt’s attempt to apply
the conceptual conflict between the social and the political to the particular historical
events of the American and French Revolutions.
As previously mentioned, Arendt broadly defined the political realm as consisting
of those human actions that are purposed towards the construction of a common world.
Furthermore, she considered the political to have sole rights over all experiences which can
be classified as genuinely free: “freedom is exclusively located in the political realm.”12
Taken together, these two criteria – actions dedicated to creating a political community and
the emergence of freedom – adequately bound the regions of Arendt’s political realm.
First, by linking inextricably her notions of political action and a common world, Arendt
elevates the interrelated ideas of speech, plurality, and equality, all of which are necessary
for persons to be able to contribute towards a “common world.” Speech serves the purpose
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of revealing political actors, enabling them to appear before others and beginning the
process of forming their public identity.13 In turn, the very possibility of a public identity
implies that citizens are viewed as distinct from one another, that they each embody a
different answer to the question “Who are you?”14 These answers, while learned through
continued political interaction, are necessarily begun with the singular event of each
person’s first articulated appearance. Thus, the “who” of each citizen is always unique, an
irreplaceable contribution to the plurality of the common world. Should this plurality
disappear and anonymity emerge, citizens would no longer be able to contribute qua
citizens – they would simply be members of a single mass moved not by the deliberation
of opinions and consensual agreement but instead by some overwhelming force. Equality,
in cooperation with speech and plurality, describes the set of conditions within which
individual persons are afforded the same kind of access to and membership in a
participatory polity, negating the age-old distinction between “rulers” and “the ruled” and
ensuring that citizens can “understand each other and those who came before them [as well
as] plan for the future.”15 No citizen, insofar as they have a genuine identity and stake in
their community, can be forced into submission to another, for this would negate the
legitimacy of their appearance, subsuming it under the auspices of a ruler-figure.
Arendt’s definition of freedom and its associated concepts were discussed at length
in the previous chapter, and thus I will only briefly outline them here for the purpose of
completing my explanation of her political realm. Arendtian freedom is located within
essentially spontaneous or new acts which in turn can only come about through the
presentation of novel possibilities by and with others in community. This process demands
that individuals, through their mutual revelation of each others’ identities and deliberation
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concerning each others’ opinions, offer one another the opportunity to formulate courses of
action that are concerned primarily with the preservation of their political forum. In doing
so, individuals are removed from the confining necessity of their private impulses and
desires and allowed to participate in the creation and execution of prospectively freeing
activities. To put it differently: persons (on their own) are unable to conceive of actions
apart from the satisfaction of their needs and wants, and so, should they join together for
the purpose of forming and conserving a political body (i.e. a community which preserves
equality and plurality), the possibility of non-necessitated action will present itself. This
possibility, which is fundamentally novel to each individual within the polity, is itself the
means for experiencing freedom. Furthermore, just as Arendt’s depiction of a common
world eliminates the distinction between rulers and those who are ruled, so does her actionbased definition of freedom erase the separation of means and ends in human activity.16
Since freedom qualifies the appearance of actions purposed for the furtherance of one’s
own political community, and since political communities are themselves realized in these
common activities, the actions of Arendt’s citizens have as their end their own execution.
That is to say, since polities are formed by citizens’ activities, and since the purpose of
political action is to create and sustain polities, the actions (praxeis) of citizens are, as
Aristotle would have it, ends in themselves.17
In contrast and opposition to this political realm of egalitarian commonality and
freedom, Arendt posits the social realm in two distinct ways: 1) negatively as a nonpolitical and non-private realm which functions in opposition to both private and the
political forms of activity, and 2) positively as an amalgam of private and public activities
that lends itself to conformist behavior and economic functionality. I will unpack the latter
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explanation first so that the ways social activity opposes political interaction are seen most
clearly. Furthermore, I will pay especially close attention to how the conditions for human
activity presented by the social realm negate the possibility of freedom (as Arendt defines
it). This should reinforce our understanding of Arendtian freedom as entirely exclusive of
functional role-play.
Arendt’s first attempt at defining the social realm in The Human Condition goes as
follows: “[the social realm is] the rise of the ‘household’ (oikia) or of economic activities
to the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the private sphere
of the family have become a ‘collective’ concern.”18 A few pages later, she offers a more
succinct version of the same claim: “[society] is that curiously hybrid realm where private
interests assume public significance.”19 Her analysis of the phenomenon of the social goes
in various directions after this point, exploring connections to American consumerism,
European class society, and bureaucracy (among other things), but this first definition
remains consistent and informative throughout these various investigations. Thus, we must
carefully consider what is meant by “the rise of the household” (and, accordingly, ‘private
interests’) to the public realm. Certainly, this transferal of private functions to the political
realm20 is not literal: the familial relationships and activities within households do not
correlate directly with the relationships formed by persons in society. Rather, I would
claim that the infusion of public significance to private acts via their public appearance
necessitates a translation of household rules and roles. The result is the emergence of
conformist behavior and a preoccupation with economic jobholding, both of which lead to
the denigration of human activity into mere functionality.
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Arendt describes this state of affairs as absolute rulership without an actual ruler:
“But this nobody, the assumed one interest of society as a whole in economics as well as
the assumed one opinion of polite society in the salon, does not cease to rule for having
lost its personality.”21 Since the private realm is concerned with activities directed towards
the satisfaction of biological (i.e. eating, sleeping) and relational (i.e. parenting, romantic
companionship) needs, and since these activities are purely functional towards these
necessitated ends, the spread of private acts and “interests” within the interaction of
individuals in public space conceptually implies the creation of need-based, “social” roles
with both economic and relational components. We might interpret Arendt’s diagnosis of
American society’s tendency towards normalized behavior and the glorification of
jobholding, then, as apt examples of how her social realm displays the two-part
functionality (i.e. biological and relational needs) of the private realm, remaining
consistent with her conceptual framework’s necessary consequences.
From here, we can begin to discern the antagonism towards all things political that
Arendt attributes to the social realm. First, she finds that the imposition of economic and
conformist functionality destroys the possibility of joint action outright: “society expects
from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various
rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its members … [and] to exclude spontaneous
action.”22 By demanding that persons direct their efforts towards purely economic and/or
normalizing objectives, individuals are prevented from thinking and acting beyond their
own needs and wants. Consequently, the job-functions of economics and conformist
standards of class and mass society simply reflect the individuated necessity of the private
realm, demanding need-based behavior that by its very definition is incapable of presenting

38

the sort of novel possibilities necessary for political activity. And, as previously
demonstrated, the ability of persons to join together and formulate novel possibilities – that
is, “spontaneous action” – is crucial for the realization of Arendtian freedom. Additionally,
by restricting human activity to necessitated behavior, the social precludes the formation of
public identities and relationships and therefore hinders political speech and action – the
very lifeblood of freedom’s existence within the political realm.
Secondly, Arendt finds that the social realm’s inherent functionality leads to the
destruction of plurality and the emergence of anonymity. By reducing participation in
common endeavors to task-driven behavior, society’s members act as faceless
functionaries that, while perhaps performing different chores, are essentially
undifferentiated from one another in terms of their public appearance. This translates into
the establishment of anonymity, for if persons cannot distinguish themselves based upon
their appearances to one another, they have no means by for the construction of unique
identities. We can further conclude that this social anonymity directly corresponds to the
emergence of expendability, for insofar as the functioning of individuals makes them
indistinguishable from one another, each member of the social realm becomes replaceable
by any other co-functionary.23 A second apolitical consequence of the social realm’s
functional anonymity is the destruction of equality. While a certain leveling of conditions
may result from conformist and economic behavior, equality (according to Arendt)
demands more than this, minimally requiring that individuals have the opportunity for
pluralistic participation in politics. By eliminating, through the enforcement of functional
roles, the possibility for individual distinction based upon the announcement of public
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identities, the social realm creates an experience of sameness that is an insufficient
replacement for the properly political experience of equality.24
This is certainly not to say that economics and social interactions are by themselves
hostile towards politics, or that economic systems can be developed only at the expense of
political participation. When dealing with these descriptions of types of activities, one is
permitted to conclude only that social acts, both economic and conformist, are simply not
political acts, and vice versa. Furthermore, since Arendt focused her critique on the
seemingly unlimited growth of the social realm in contemporary America – which we can
translate as the increasing tendency of persons to act for purely social purposes – we can
safely conclude that her claims concerning the expansion of the social realm at the expense
of the political mean only that, as persons dedicate themselves more completely to social
behavior, they will become less able and willing to engage in politics. The purposes of
political deeds, as well as the plurality and equality upon which they rely, are entirely
incompatible with the type of activity characterized by the social realm and must be sought
independently of social acts. Therefore, if we dare to hope for the emergence of freedom
from the eclipse of the social realm’s predominance in recent times, we must also strive for
the creation of polities within which human actions can be separated from the functionality
of social ends.
III
- PITKIN’S CRITIQUE and a CRITICAL DEFENSE of ARENDT’S SOCIAL REALM Arendt’s theoretical account of society and politics in the modern age is far from
problem-free, as seeming contradictions and ambiguities greet attempts to extract a
systematic political philosophy from her writings. Few recent commentators have
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expressed greater discontent with these inconsistencies than Hannah Pitkin, and so in the
following paragraphs, I will revisit her interpretation of Arendt’s political thought,
primarily focusing on her work, Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the
Social. I find her understanding of Arendt to be misleading, insofar as she fails to
recognize many of the connections vital to interpreting Arendt’s use of various examples
and definitions given within her theoretical political framework; thus, I will also respond to
Pitkin in defense of Arendt’s designation of a “social realm” along with the primary
meaning Arendt attached to this term. However, difficulties do arise upon consideration of
some of the particular applications Arendt assigned to “the social,” including her insistence
that questions of welfare, which are of an allegedly social nature, be excluded from
political debate. Therefore, using the critical analysis of Richard J. Bernstein, I will
prescribe how Arendt’s theoretical work might be preserved without sacrificing the
participatory opportunities of impoverished individuals.
Pitkin’s Attack of the Blob is itself an attack on Arendt’s political philosophy on
many fronts, ranging from psychoanalytic discussions of Arendt’s fatherless childhood and
adult romantic relationships25 to arguments establishing theoretical connections between
Arendt and Marx and Tocqueville. Here, I will limit my discussion to the three most
pertinent disagreements I have with Pitkin’s version of Arendt’s socio-political theory: 1)
her suggestion that Arendt’s social is “autonomous” and on a quest to devour individuals,
2) her claim that no real connection exists between the functionality of economic society
and the manners of class society, and 3) her argument that Arendt’s description of political
action implicitly depends upon the existence of a “free will” within individual actors.
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Pitkin begins Attack of the Blob with an explanation of the linkage between “the
Blob” and Arendt’s social: “Arendt depicts [the social realm] as a living, autonomous
agent determined to dominate human beings, absorb them, and render them helpless.”26
That is to say, like the monster-movie Blob of the 1950s, Arendt’s social realm is an
amorphous, unstoppable entity that grows and grows as it continually consumes more and
more human lives. Since persons seem utterly helpless when faced with its expansion,
Pitkin suggests that a more accurate, “demythologized” understanding of Arendt’s social
realm is to be found in the diagnosis of those states of affairs in which individuals feel
and/or are impotent in regards to the consequences of their actions.27 With regards to the
specific conditions and causes of this debilitating phenomenon, Pitkin is unhelpful,
suggesting that Arendt herself is inconsistent as to the specific characteristics of the social
realm. Yet, as previously demonstrated, Arendt’s definition of the social realm as those
activities that combine public significance with private functions, while broad, is quite
congruent with her various references to and applications of the same.28 That is to say,
while her examples of social behavior are diverse and seemingly disparate, they find
commonality in their exhibition of actions that are necessitated by private functionality and
yet are public in their appearance and import for human interaction.
Additionally, it is a fundamental misunderstanding of Arendt’s methodology on
Pitkin’s part that leads her to conclude that Arendt’s social realm acts, in its mythical form,
as an independent being that absorbs individual lives, and non-mythically as the
destruction of individual agents’ efficacy. Arendt’s definition of realms, as already
discussed, deals solely with the categorical description of human activities, and thus, these
realms can have no existence apart from their application to “the realm of human affairs.”
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The social is not, as Pitkin would suggest, autonomous in its movement towards
domination, but rather an attempt to clarify and respond to the decline of genuine political
activity and the rise of economic and conformist behavior in the modern age through the
use of theoretical categories. Thus, by using terms such as “absorption” and “devouring,”29
Arendt is not suggesting that the social realm has a life of its own but rather that those
activities designated by the social realm have been granted a predominant role in modern
life by modern humans themselves, thus “expanding” the social realm’s boundaries and
diminishing the possibility of political interaction. Furthermore, if persons feel a loss of
control in the wake of their participation in Arendt’s social realm, it is not because the
consequences of their actions have been removed from their control, as if they were
transformed into mindless machines by some menacing force. Rather, their social servitude
of private necessity is akin to the proverbial donkey that is willing to drag a cart daily
because a carrot is dangled in front of its nose, all the while surrounded by lush, open
fields. Individuals need only divert their attention from functional needs to the pursuit of
common interests with one another in order to move beyond their burdensome routines.
At various points in Attack of the Blob, Pitkin expresses bewilderment at Arendt’s
attribution of both economic and conformist characteristics to the social realm:
“But what is the connection between, on the one hand, suppressing individuality,
imposing rules of behavior, the polite conformity of the salon, and, on the other,
economics, necessity, and biology? Salon behavior and biological urges seem
almost polar opposites.”30
Indeed, she is right to suggest that Arendt consistently refers to both jobholding-oikia
activity and the conformist “manners” of class society as essentially social behavior, for
these are, in fact, the paradigmatic cases Arendt uses to exemplify the social realm.
However, their connection lies not with the fact that, as Pitkin hypothesizes, “a large
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population presupposes a complex economy”; she herself admits the inadequacy of this
explanation.31 Rather, the previously discussed notion of functional role-play within the
social realm is what holds these two components together, as both a jobholder’s mentality
and norm-driven behavior display a similar denigration of human action into mere
functionality. Again, since the desire for relational closeness and the satisfaction of
physical needs, both of which Arendt labels “private,”32 necessitate the formation of social
roles when given public exposure, all attempts to fill these roles in public must consist of
activity that is functional towards one or both of these private ends. There is no mysterious
divergence, then, between conformist and economic manifestations of social behavior; they
are simply reflective of the twofold nature of the private realm – relational needs and
physical/biological needs – and are thus far from being “polar opposites.”
Lastly, I wish to address Pitkin’s claim that Arendt’s conception of political action
implicitly depends upon the acknowledgment of some sort of “free will” within individual
citizens. Pitkin offers very little justification for this assertion, and in fact spends relatively
little time addressing it. Her entire statement on the matter is as follows:
“The free will question, in particular, [Arendt] construes narrowly as focused on an
inner something called ‘the will’ and whether it is ‘free.’ In that sense the issue is,
as she points out, invented by philosophers only after political freedom had
disappeared from the ancient world. She does not acknowledge, and probably does
not see, the extent to which her own teachings about political freedom depend on
the free will conundrum more broadly construed, how the very idea of action
presupposes something like free will, and how here distinction between freedom
and necessity is another version of the same conundrum.”33
Since Arendt herself was deeply concerned with defining freedom as an exclusively
political phenomenon and also, as Pitkin admits, argued explicitly against the philosophical
use of the “free will,” and since the present project is dedicated in large part to Arendt’s
definition of freedom, I find it important to adequately respond to Pitkin on this matter.

44

First, it is unclear exactly why Pitkin thinks that participation in Arendt’s political realm
demands the existence of a free will writ large; perhaps it is in large part due to Pitkin’s
belief, as expressed in other parts of Attack of the Blob, that the choices of individuals qua
individuals are absolutely essential to any analysis of political phenomena: “If one puts the
perspective of the agent at the center, then the only ‘explanation’ of the social one needs or
can have is that we aren’t yet doing anything to diminish it.”34 However, this still fails to
establish a clear connection between the action of Arendtian citizens, which demonstrates
only the need for the public associations, and the free willing of individuals.
Secondly, Arendt’s argument against traditional conceptions of the free will is
based upon two crucial premises: 1) that an individual “will” can never appear in “the
phenomenal world,”35 making the free will as hidden and ambiguous as private intention,
and 2) that the free will’s dependence upon a foreseen consequence for a given choice
negates both its alleged freedom and renders it ineffectual in the face of changing
circumstances and weakened resolve36 – neither of which are clearly addressed by Pitkin,
thus making her argument for Arendt’s implicit dependence upon the existence of
individually free wills quite unconvincing. That is to say, Pitkin does not directly respond
to Arendt’s assertion that the free will’s invisible, insensible, and radically private nature
makes it an unsuitable basis for defining freedom, which, as a reality that ought to be
located in the visible world of human affairs, must appear in some manner. Neither does
she answer Arendt’s convincing argument that any analysis of the free will breaks down
upon consideration of the many instances in which the supposed “willing” of an individual
are confounded by impotence on the part of the actor or changing external circumstances.
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Thus, Pitkin is unable to fully substantiate her claim that Arendt’s notion of
political action necessitates a “free will” of some sort. In fact, the contrast between
freedom and necessity, as portrayed by Arendt and explicated in the previous chapter, has
very little to do with individual choices by themselves and very much to do with the nature
of collective interactions, which in turn may contain individually “willed” choices but are
in no way reducible to them. Arendtian political action can occur whether or not
individuals are “willing” their decisions, for it emerges only from those words and deeds
that appear to others and thus it is brought forth solely by a community of citizens.
It would be dishonest to go on from here without acknowledging the problematic
inconsistencies that emerge within Arendt’s account of the social realm. Most of them can
be summarized with her occasional attempts to label specific issues, such as poverty and
welfare, “private” and/or “social,” thus implying that these concerns themselves are
inappropriate for political forums. This is most blatant in On Revolution, within which, as
discussed previously, Arendt compares the American and French Revolutions specifically
in terms of the establishment, in the case of the former, and destruction, in the case of the
latter, of genuine politics and freedom. The ways the French Revolution functioned for the
purpose of alleviating poverty are, for Arendt, a prime example of the overwhelming force
of the “social question.”37 By concerning itself primarily with the problems of material
destitution, Arendt finds that the French Revolution sacrificed its ability to be political and,
in doing so, became an essentially “social” movement through its elevation of private
needs (i.e. poverty) to the level of public and/or governmental consideration. Thus, the
“necessity” of private, biological need was introduced into governmental affairs,
transforming political activities into social behavior.38 Unfortunately, Arendt goes one step
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further by claiming that “the multitude of the poor” themselves were partially responsible
for burdening the French Revolution with social concerns, thus contributing to its demise:
“When [the poor] appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared with them.”39 This
is very problematic when considered in light of the activity-based interpretation of
Arendt’s realms for which I have been arguing, certainly lending ammunition to those,
such as Pitkin, who have labeled Arendt’s political theory as elitist – focused on recovering
the hubristic glory of ancient Athens and neglectful of the fate of the downtrodden.
In fact, there is no satisfactory explanation to be gleaned from Arendt’s work which
could somehow integrate her claim that poverty, and those who represent it, should be
excluded from political discourse and action with her larger, broader differentiations of the
social and political realms based upon the diverging purposes of collective activities. The
very nature of realms based in the description of activities, rooted in the attribution of
purposes, is, as we have seen, incompatible with the assignment of particular issues and
socio-economic classes to these realms. One might even claim that Arendt is guilty of
equivocation on this point, insofar as she uses the term “social” to refer to both a kind of
human activity characterized by its privately-sourced functionality and the widespread
public concern with how material resources are distributed.
The question then becomes: how do we maintain a coherent understanding of
Arendt’s social realm, if such coherency is at all possible? I would suggest that, by
returning to her definition of the social realm in The Human Condition, one that is firmly
planted in the qualitative description of human activity and thus clearly placed within her
theoretical framework, we can disregard her later digressions into particular “social”
issues. Whether or not they were carefully thought out, perhaps as well-intentioned
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attempts to illustrate the prescience of her work, or simply careless theoretical slips on her
part, we can separate them from the rest of her conceptual framework by reconsidering the
discursive nature of her political realm. For Arendt, the act of announcing oneself as a
member of a political community of equals and bringing to the forum opinions for debate
is the defining act of citizenship.
This means that the decision of what issues should be deliberated is as much a part
of the political process as the actual deliberation itself. 40 Richard J. Bernstein puts this
quite succinctly: “Indeed, the question whether a problem is itself properly social (and
therefore not worthy of public debate) or political is itself frequently the central political
issue.”41 For individuals experiencing the want and misery of poverty, it would amount to
nothing short of discriminatory injustice to refuse them the opportunity to share with their
political community the problems created by material deprivation. How else will such
societal ills be addressed in an equitable and effective manner, if political bodies do not
welcome the testimony of the impoverished? Considering Arendt’s definition of the social
and political realms by themselves, it certainly does not follow that the inclusion of the
economically underprivileged on the part of polities would compromise their unique
promise of freedom, and the imposing of a priori boundaries on the content of public
discourse could be said to contradict the purpose of such speech itself.
IV
- AMERICAN CONSUMERISM and MEGACHURCHES Having explored the definition and theoretical implications of Arendt’s social
realm by itself, we can move on to examine the ways its adoption of the expansion
principle of laboring – the belief that the growth of laboring processes is valuable for its
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own sake – results in a dangerous distortion of purposes in the realms of human activity. A
current manifestation of this phenomenon can be detected in American consumerism,
which is described by Arendt as a “consumer’s society.”42 To her, consumerism represents
the embodiment of the expansion principle as a fundamental value within the economic
division of the social realm; this labor-oriented sector has spread, in turn, into all other
aspects of human life, including the state, non-economic society, and the household,
transforming private and public activities alike into consumption-oriented enterprises. The
result is a state of affairs in which anonymity and expendability have become pervasive
features of human existence. Here, I will focus my discussion on what I believe to be a
uniquely dangerous symptom of consumerism – the megachurch movement, which will
also demonstrate Arendt’s critique to be quite relevant in our own context. The possibility
of freedom presented to citizens is inestimably fragile, and unless we are willing to
confront how the lives of Americans are increasingly dedicated to the functionality of a
“consumer’s society,” we will lose sight of this freedom altogether, forgetting the promise
of politics and forsaking our uniquely human potential for freedom.
Arendt situates her discussion of consumerism within the definition and analysis of
labor as a form of human activity that corresponds exclusively to the satisfaction of desires
and needs through the consumption and production of commodities.43 For Arendt, labor
exists in contrast to work and action, thus forming a descriptive system of activity
categories that, at first glance, seems to parallel her development of the private, social and
public realms. However, a crucial distinction exists between these two frameworks – while
the categories of the private realm, social realm, and public realm correspond directly to
the quality or purpose of human acts, the division of labor, work, and action express the
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relationship between human deeds and the external world. Thus, while the private realm
entails those actions done for the express purpose of fulfilling private needs, labor consists
of those activities focused on the production and consumption of items that, while usually
used for the purpose of satisfying personal appetites, are primarily characterized by the fact
that they are made to be consumed: “It is indeed the mark of all laboring that it leaves
nothing behind.”44 Thus, it is not private necessity, but a lack of durability, which signifies
the products of labor, implying that laborers relate to the world around them by
transforming it through production into things for consumption. Additionally, Arendt
claims that the processes of labor are cyclical insofar as they continually move between the
production and consumption of commodities, each part necessitating the performance of
the other as the physical exertion spent in laboring must be compensated by adequate
consumption, and, in turn, the depletion created by consumption must be replenished by
further laboring.45 We can conclude, then, that by placing her analysis of consumerism
within her discussion of laboring, Arendt is suggesting that consumerism is the state of
affairs emerging from social activity that is characterized primarily by the laborer’s
mindset, the perspective that views the world solely in terms of its consumable form.
Arendt claims that the cyclical nature of laboring activity, when given a dominant
status in the social realm, exhibits an inherent tendency for expansion. Her reasoning goes
as follows: since contemporary society has given normative priority to the notion of
increasing abundance or profit (one and the same for our purposes), and since laboring is
the only mode of action whose cyclical nature ensures such a continual increase of capital,
the social realm will inevitably seek to expand its laboring processes so that individuals
will have ever-decreasing amounts of time and energy to spend on any other kind of
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activity but laboring.46 This is strikingly evidenced by the social mandate insisting that
“whatever we do, we are supposed to do for the sake of ‘making a living.”47 In other
words, by bowing to the pressure to dedicate themselves to increasing the accumulation of
capital, both for themselves in the form of wages and for the profits of their social
organizations (e.g. corporations),48 and to do so by viewing their actions in terms of the
production-consumption cycle, individuals commit their lives to expanding the domain of
human activity over which consumerism’s values reign. In doing so, they resign
themselves to the functional membership offered by a consumerist society. Here, job titles
matter very little, for both an assembly-line worker and a professor can view their jobs
simply as a means towards gaining enough money to purchase a desired amount of
commodities (i.e. “making a living”).
This participation in a consumerist social realm is functional due to the very nature
of consumerism itself. Its end is the expansion of its own influence, and this expansion can
only occur insofar as more and more aspects of the world are transformed into
commodities. This process demands, in turn, that individuals lend themselves as functional
components. Thus, within a consumerist society we see that the economically functional
component of social activity (i.e. the satisfaction of physical needs on a public scale) is
paired with the consumption-oriented perspective of laboring, with the natural result that
members of consumerist societies find as the purpose of their deeds the endless expansion
of production and consumption processes. Whether or not these jobholders produce and
consume in terms of capital, money, or actual physical items matters very little so long as
stock options, salaries, and cars are viewed primarily as useful components for life within
the production-consumption process.
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Consumerism’s upshot for humans in terms of their potential for politics is
devastating. If the social realm by itself represents human activity which is apolitical, a
consumerist social realm represents human activity that is not merely apolitical but
unavoidably hostile towards politics. For, by increasingly devoting themselves to the
cyclical metabolism of consumerism, individuals are at the same time committing
themselves to the elimination of the possibility for political forums. This is due to the
implications of consumerism’s inherent push for expansion. Since a laboring perspective is
not bounded by particular kinds of items, but instead represents a way of relating to the
world as a whole, consumerist processes will be applied to as many aspects of human life
as possible. This means that, since the continual increase of production capacities
inevitably physically exhausts the individuals who act as producers, “leisure” time will be
designated solely as the opportunity to consume sufficient amounts of commodities (e.g.
food, and entertainment) in order to enter into the production process for another day.49
Thus, even the “superfluities” of life, such as television, music, games, and even religion,
are placed within the cycle of consumerism, resulting in “the grave danger that eventually
no object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation through
consumption.”50
In this modus operandi, there is no opportunity for persons to meet with one
another as citizens, and, in fact, such political relationships are necessarily discouraged, for
they can do no more than interfere with the furtherance of consumerism’s domain. The
realization of politics depends upon the presence of citizens who recognize the inherent
value of each other’s appearances, which would imply that no one’s words and deeds are
entirely subjected to a removed end but instead are always treated, to some extent, as
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intrinsically precious.51 If, on the other hand, individuals spend all their time as laboring
consumers, either producing or consuming commodities, the notion of collective action for
the creation and sustenance of polities is hardly a distant hope, for no actions are viewed as
valuable in themselves but instead are thought to be purely functional within the
production-consumption process. No individual’s deeds are allowed to become the
irreplaceable constituents of a political body, lest the laborer’s mentality be set aside and
replaced with the intersubjective perspective of a citizen, the viewpoint of a speaking doer
seeking to understand itself as such within the context of other speaking doers.
Furthermore, how persons relate to one another when acting as members of a
consumerist society, if such interaction can be said to occur, is merely as co-producers and
co-consumers and not as individually identified citizens, for they differ from one another
only in terms of the particular manner in which they produce and consume. Thus, even
though one individual might produce (and, in doing so, obtain sufficient amounts of money
for consumption) in terms of being a nurse and another as a doctor, if they both maintain
the perspective of a laboring consumer, the difference implied by their titles is negligible in
terms of their respective roles in consumerist society. Both are simply contributing to an
increase in the amount of laboring and consuming activity done in a social manner. This
sameness necessarily implies anonymity, for if the means for the formation of individual
political identities have been removed from consideration, and if the one remaining
possibility for distinction within society – job titles – is insufficient for distinguishing
individuals from one another, how then could we conclude otherwise? And, just as the
anonymity of social functionality implies expendability, so do the anonymous job-roles of
a consumerist society make individuals essentially expendable. So long as one devotes the
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whole of one’s time to the increase of production and consumption, “who” one is becomes
entirely insignificant, and thus, the role one plays within society is entirely replaceable.
Blinded from viewing their actions as anything other than the deeds of production and
consumption and thus incapable of forming relationships that could reveal one another as
citizens, we can safely conclude that the members of a consumer’s society are by definition
interchangeable and, thereby, politically impotent.
In order to better illustrate what is meant by this analysis of consumerism, I will
next critically examine the megachurch movement. Widely defined as those Christian
congregations which boast a weekly attendance of at least two thousand persons, a more
telling analysis of this recent phenomenon entails the examination of “organizational and
leadership dynamics”52 that evidence unmistakable symptoms of the aforementioned
characteristics of consumerism. Therefore, for our purposes, megachurches will be defined
as follows: local religious institutions that claim Christianity as their faith identity,
maintain a belief that their organizational expansion is an unqualified good, and thus, are
also willing to utilize a vast administrative apparatus to facilitate such growth.
“I’m just trying to get people in the door.”53 Such is the nature of the seemingly
innocent justification given by megachurch ministers for the rapidly increasing size of their
churches. What underlies this reasoning is the belief that church growth is necessarily a
good – that is, a value that needs no critical consideration – thereby allowing for
organizational expansion to act as an overarching end, intentionally or otherwise. As
growth rates spiral upwards, emerging megachurches tend to “evolve their buildings,
leadership, and programmatic structures along with their growth.”54 Put simply, as
churches grow exponentially, their belief that such growth is unquestioningly good
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naturally implies that they will begin functioning for the purpose of maintaining their
increasing magnitude. Megachurch members, in turn, are expected to play a part in this
growth process, first as consistent attendees (i.e. consumers of church services) and
eventually as participators in the execution of church functions (i.e. producers of church
services): “There are always groups [within megachurches] which organize and train
church volunteers both to assist in the functioning of the church and in the performance of
its ministries.”55 As megachurches position themselves to welcome and employ the
resources of more and more individuals, they are required to develop a startling number of
ministry options – ranging from financial help seminars to Judo exercise classes – that
require a large number of people to both lead (i.e. produce) and participate (i.e.
consume).56 The result is a vast apparatus of ministry outlets which takes on the feeling of
a commercial shopping center, offering potential consumers more opportunities then could
ever be exhausted in a lifetime.57
Lest the reader think me unfair in my assertion that megachurches are akin to the
secular temples of American commercialism, consider this telling quote taken from an
interview with a prominent megachurch leader: “We want the church to look like a mall.
We want you to come in here and say, ‘Dude, where’s the cinema?’”58 In fact, I would
suggest that commercialistic tendencies are nothing short of a natural consequence of these
religious organizations’ unwavering adherence to the furtherance of their own growth,
given our consumerist context and the “seeker-friendly” tendencies of modern evangelical
theology. Since shopping malls are a central institution within the secular consumerist
realm, and since the tenets of evangelism provide a deceiving justification for the endless
growth of churches, it is quite unsurprising that megachurches would unflinchingly
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embrace organizational aspects of consumerist institutions such as malls. Members need
only remind themselves of the higher purpose of their expansionist activities – the eternal
salvation of souls – if the commercial nature of their project ever disturbs their conscience.
It is not difficult to see how Arendt’s diagnosis of consumerism applies to the
conditions of megachurch development, both in regards to their definition and implications
for human activity. Megachurches facilitate institutional expansion by appealing to new
“consumers” with advertisements and entertaining services, and then, in order to maintain
their increasing size, find ways for consistent attendees to play a part in facilitating
services and ministries (which in turn act as consumption opportunities for others) while
still allowing them to maintain a high level of service-consumption themselves. This
reflects Arendt’s description of the cyclical process of production and consumption that
characterizes a laboring consumer’s society and evidences her claim that consumerism, as
a social phenomenon, will inherently seek to envelop all aspects of life, including
“superfluities” such as religious practice. For, religious belief and the activities of churches
do not seem to be, in themselves, directed towards a consumerist increase in organizational
resources and magnitude. However, as more and more individuals have learned to partake
in consumerism’s process by viewing their actions (and the actions of others) as functional
within expanding consumption-production cycles, enterprises such as churches are
exposed to the possibility of acting for consumerist ends i.e. seeking their own growth as
an end in itself and utilizing a production-consumption process to facilitate such growth.
Full-fledged members of megachurches, so long as they are consistent and active
consumers and producers of church services and ministries, serve primarily functional ends
within their respective churches, thus exemplifying the anonymity of a consumerist
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society. Since the growth of their church is a surpassing and unquestionably good end, and
since the achievement of this end comes through the attendance and facilitation of services,
members differ very little from one another in terms of the qualitative appearance of their
activities. While one might be a nursery worker, another might help park cars, and another
might serve coffee in between Sunday morning services, they all still share the same fate of
playing a given part in their organization’s growth, known not by their potential identity
(their “who”) but instead by the functional role they fulfill. And, as we might expect, this
widespread implementation of functional roles results in the emergence of expendability
insofar as the functioning of one megachurch member is, for all intents and purposes,
easily replaced by any other. The result is a state of affairs in which individuals tend to
refrain from taking hold of their spiritual beliefs and growth, unprompted to develop their
capacities for ethical thought and community action, and instead must rely upon the church
to control and centralize the ways in which participation in religious activities and the
formation of belief systems takes place.59 Additionally, by being relieved of personal
responsibility and the possibility of participating in collective action, megachurch members
are left to find purpose in their own functionality, resulting in a distortion of significance
lamented by Arendt in the following passage from The Origins of Totalitarianism:
“No matter what individual qualities or defects a man may have, once he has
entered the maelstrom of an unending process of expansion, he will, as it were,
cease to be what he was and obey the laws of the process, identify himself with
anonymous forces that he is supposed to serve in order to keep the whole process in
motion; he will think of himself as mere function, and eventually consider such
functionality…his highest possible achievement.”60
Such is the state of affairs in which individuals, blind to their futility and vulnerable to the
religious institutions on which they depend for their spiritual livelihood, are subject to
what I suggest is a most frightening irony: megachurches, while claiming to continue the

57

radically humanizing work of Jesus of Nazareth, employ organizational operating patterns
that are, at their core, denigrating and homogenizing towards all who take part in the
furthering of their expansionist ends.
Yet, we must also remember Arendt’s insistence that, no matter how discouraging
or devastating the effects of social institutions such as consumerism and political
movements akin to National Socialism, we should never come to the point of losing all
hope and so think “that modern man has lost his capacities [for freedom] or is on the point
of losing them.”61 Despite the overwhelming prevalence of anti-political ways of living,
we should not despair that all hope for politics is lost. Rather, we must reconsider our
potential for acting in non-social ways, consumerist or otherwise, and begin meeting with
one another for the purpose of creating forums that sustain public identities and thus foster
and protect the emergence of freedom. We might be surprised at the nearness of these
potential polities and thus begin to truly appreciate the unwavering optimism Arendt was
able to maintain – both in the wake of totalitarianism’s terrors and in the face of
consumerism’s seemingly endless growth and inhibition of human freedom.
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III. CIVIL SOCIETY and the RESTORATION of FREEDOM:
Incorporating the Phenomenal Freedom of Social Associations into Arendt’s
Framework
Freedom for them could exist only in public; it was a tangible, worldly reality, something
created by men to be enjoyed by men rather than a gift or a capacity, it was the man-made
public space or market-place which antiquity had known as the area where freedom
appears and becomes visible to all. – Hannah Arendt
Upon considering the nature of orders that, at their core, are prohibitive of
freedom’s emergence, we are left with two crucial questions: 1) How can we define the
interpersonal conditions for freedom (remaining consistent with the conclusions drawn in
Part I), given the constraints of our consumerist context, and 2) How can we incorporate
the results of this inquiry into Arendt’s theory of realms, since it is from this framework we
have extracted our understanding of freedom? To be successful in this endeavor, we will
have to first reconsider the essentially phenomenal nature of Arendtian freedom and then,
from there, discern the types of human interactions within which this freedom can appear.
It is my claim that civil society, understood as a non-economic sector of social activity, is
both a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of these sorts of relationships.
Unfortunately, within the history of modern philosophy, the term “civil society” has been
used to describe a variety of social and/or political systems, multifarious in both purpose
and character. Thus, using the relatively recent work of Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato in
their Civil Society and Political Theory, I will outline a conception of civil society that is
both non-economic and external to state institutions. This will be in keeping with the
tradition begun by Alexis de Tocqueville’s observations of spontaneous social associations
in America and his accordant analysis of their significance for the wellbeing of modern
democracies. And while I accept Cohen and Arato’s emphasis on the local, participatory,
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and “positively” free components of civil society, I find that their unqualified inclusion of
the nuclear family within civil society and suggestion that civil society is interrelated with
economic society is problematic for reasons that will be discussed later on.
Additionally, in their critical analysis of Arendt’s writings, Cohen and Arato argue
that Arendt acts as a critic of civil society, a claim which I reject. Arendt never uses the
term “civil society,” at least in her works of political theory, and thus any suggestion of
strong opposition on her part to a concept of civil society must be subject to great scrutiny.
It is my belief that they confuse Arendt’s description of the social realm’s activity as
fundamentally nonpolitical with their own elucidation of civil society as essentially
political, thus leading them to peg Arendt as a critic of civil society and preventing them
from acknowledging how Arendt’s framework is possibly inclusive of civil society as an
origin of political interaction. In fact, I will suggest that Arendt’s definition and description
of the political realm and its corresponding mode of doing (“action”), when considered in
light of the implications of a consumer’s society, is most clearly exemplified by civilsocial institutions and, thus, the experience of Arendtian freedom depends upon the
establishment of such organizations. That is to say, in order to recover our capacity for
forming the kind of relationships that will allow us to engage in non-consumerist public
activity, we ought to turn to those forums that are both locally accessible and potentially
available for universal participation. Fortunately, Arendt’s writings are not devoid of
guidance on this topic. Her illuminating discussions of both Thomas Jefferson’s “ward
system,” which was inspired by the town hall meetings of the American Revolution, and
the worker’s movements of the 19th and 20th centuries point explicitly towards localized,
more “social” forms of politics and their significance for the human experience of freedom.
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I
- INTERSUBJECTIVE FREEDOM and CIVIL INTERACTIONS I asserted in Chapter I that freedom should be considered as a purely public
phenomenon, demanding both the presence of others for the formation of public identities
and a willingness to make promises and offer forgiveness within one’s own community in
order to sustain citizenship. Here, I want to further explicate this argument, focusing on the
seemingly peculiar notion that freedom must appear, an idea that stands in stark contrast
with more traditional understandings of freedom as an internal, or at least individualized,
experience. By making this concept of “phenomenal” freedom more clear, I also hope to
demonstrate how civil-social relationships are its proper facilitators. They offer both a
“space” for freedom’s appearance and the opportunity for the continual reappearance of
public actors, thus allowing for a consistent and substantial experience of freedom.
Initially, the suggestion that freedom should be defined as an exclusively public
experience is somewhat jarring, resonating dissonantly with the fact that some of our most
cherished “freedoms,” such as the freedom of speech, originate with the notion that our
private thoughts – if nothing else – can be considered free. Therefore, some justification is
needed to sustain my position. In Chapter I, I offered an argument for this same purpose
that can be summarized roughly as follows: Freedom, insofar as it exists in contrast to
private necessity and depends upon the experience of novel possibilities, requires that
persons pursue the common good of a community within which these novel possibilities
can be presented. This, in turn, demands that public identities are formed. Thus, if we
allow for freedom to exist at a private level, we imply that either 1) freedom can be had
without novel possibilities (a contradiction in light of our operating definition of freedom)
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or 2) public identities can be formed in private, thereby undermining the stability necessary
for the creation of communities and destroying the foundation on which freedom is built.
Therefore, freedom ought to be viewed as a purely public phenomenon.
I think this argument is sufficient for achieving its end, but I would like to offer an
additional, somewhat similar justification that centers on a qualitative account of the nature
of freedom and echoes our prior consideration of individual intention as a faulty basis for
categorizing human activities.1 If freedom is to be spoken of as a reality for humankind, as
an appearing quality of actions that counteract and transcend the physical necessity of
private life and, in doing so, provide a firm basis for politics, it must be fundamentally
intersubjective in its character. For, as previously demonstrated, “internal” or hidden
mental states such as intention and motive, while helpful in formulating accounts of human
responsibility and voluntary action, are nigh useless when considered for their value in the
effort to categorize human activity in terms of its purpose or quality. By allowing for the
possibility of irresolvable discordance between one’s account of one’s own action (on the
basis of motive, attitude, etc.) and others’ description of the same deed, the effort to
construe human activity as characterized by purpose would never get off the ground,
paralyzed by the primacy of each individual’s private understanding of their own praxis.
We would, in effect, be committing ourselves to separating being from appearance “in the
realm of human affairs” and thus admitting that, in associating with others, we can never
know who they really are, for the purposes of their speech and action would be contained
within the mysterious true selves hidden beneath the veneer of public interaction.2
Similarly, a notion of freedom grounded solely in one’s inner experiences never
can fulfill the requirements of the project to conceive of freedom as a predicate of action
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defined by its political purpose or quality. That is, if we are to speak of freedom as existent
in words and deeds identified according to their exemplification of the purpose to form and
sustain political communities, then we must admit that its definition lies not in the private,
subjective experience of this activity but rather those aspects that are possibly experienced
simultaneously by multiple persons. This is what is meant, then, by the claim that freedom
is the “appearing quality”3 of political activity. It implies that freedom, when realized in
the context of citizens, is never experienced by a single speaker or actor by themselves,
regardless of their status as the source of words heard and deeds seen. Rather, words and
deeds act as intersubjective vehicles by which citizens can learn who they are in the
context of one another and, in doing so, partake in activity that is seen to originate not in
their private desires, needs, and volitions but rather as emergent from their collective effort
to constitute, through their appearance as citizens, a political realm.
Promises and forgiveness have already been established as pre- and co-requisite
factors for the birth and maturation of freedom within a community, inasmuch as freedom
is understood according to the previous elucidation.4 Now, I would like to explore more
thoroughly the kinds of relationships that can facilitate both of these securing forces and
distinguish them from private and economic forms of interaction. How can individuals
relate to one another in such a way as to foster the trust needed to commit to promises and
extend forgiveness, all the while maintaining their capacity to experience freedom with one
another? Or, to put it differently, under what circumstances will individuals be willing to
sustain their publicly announced identities and continue their relationships with others even
when the associated expectations are compromised?
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First, I would suggest that persons must know to whom they are making promises
and granting forgiveness in order for such acts to occur; that is, they must be fully aware of
the identities of those with whom they are interacting.5 Promising, insofar as it consists of
the commitment to maintain the expectations assigned to an individual through the
announcement of that self in a community, presupposes that the one making the promise
knows the content of the public personalities which form the context for the promise’s
execution.6 Without knowing the identities of those who form the binding provisions of a
commitment, promises dissolve into empty statements that are likely no more lasting than
the so-called “resolutions” penned on the first of January each year.7 This means,
consequently, that should new persons join a given community, promises must be
implicitly made anew in order to include the unforeseen circumstances introduced by a
new identity.
Forgiveness also requires that persons know one another as citizens, for so long as
forgiveness is understood as the deed by which individuals who have acted inconsistently
with their respective identities are allowed – and even encouraged – to remain as a vital
part of their community, it precludes the possibility of forgiving those who are not known.
Consider the paradox of inviting someone who is not known, who has not appeared as a
citizen, to continue acting as a member of one’s own community. This further means that if
individuals are forcefully prevented from entering into any sort of community, they are
incapable of forgiving those who obstruct their path to freedom. They are, in a way,
victims of an unforgivable sin, for without first forming public connections with others,
they are blind to the personalities of those who bear the burden of guilt and thus are unable
to unchain their antagonists from the results of their isolating actions. Such deeds
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“transcend the realm of human affairs,”8 making painfully clear the need to know one
another in such a way that we might provide (and be provided with) release “from the
consequences of what we have done,”9 should our acts compromise the self we have
promised to be.
Second, the existence of genuine promises and forgiveness demands that individual
identities within a given community are treated with equal import and respect. This brand
of equality can be distinguished from material and/or economic equality (and, as we found
in Part II, social “sameness”), but it is difficult to imagine how great disparities in wealth
and financial standing could exist without unduly influencing the ways in which citizens
are treated by one another. Nevertheless, equality implies first that individuals, insofar as
they form public identities through their interactions with other citizens, are given an
opportunity to partake in community affairs and that, should they choose to address their
peers, their statements are granted public consideration and subjected to deliberation.
Additionally, equality – for our purposes – allows for no citizen to act as a ruler,
even in the slightest, over any other citizen; that is to say, so long as equality is maintained
amongst members of a polity, none of them will be bound to obey the demand of any
other, no matter how venerable or influential a single member or group of members may
be. In order for promises to be made such that they genuinely reflect their content, then
citizens must be able to trust that their cohort is neither cowering before them in fear (as
subjects before a king) nor able to enforce arbitrary demands upon them (as tyrants). What
is to prevent a servant from acting deceptively in order to earn the good favor of his
master? And what compelling reason can be given to an authoritarian dictator to prevent
him from imposing mandates upon his subjects as unconditional as they are unpredictable?
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In both cases the idea of promising is made irrelevant, for neither do public commitments
bound the promise-maker to a given set of requirements nor are promise-makers provided
with a secure context within which they could possibly uphold the expectations following
from their promise. Therefore, without the assurance of an egalitarian political context,
individuals cannot muster enough confidence to assume that the persons to whom they are
making a promise will maintain their identities in a consistent manner – a necessary
condition for the formation of lasting commitments.
Similarly, the act of forgiveness itself presupposes that individuals are not affected
by the power differential of a political or social hierarchy and instead can view each
others’ transgressions as equals. Forgiveness granted from above can be received as
nothing more than a favor or, as in the Christian tradition, an act of grace, just as when a
parent, refusing to remain angry at their child’s misbehavior, invites the child to come
down from his or her room and join the family for dinner. While meaningful in certain
contexts, this attitude of graciousness is entirely inappropriate amongst citizens. It
encourages the recipients of favors to become dependent upon or indebted to their
benefactors, thus preventing the formation of independent identities. Contrarily, the
thought of an inferior forgiving a superior is almost laughable since it is expected that
those bound by obedience will submit to those in authority regardless of the moral standing
of the authority’s actions. In this instance, forgiveness is simply superfluous, for the ruler
will keep ruling and the ruled will remain subservient even if offensive actions committed
by the former are left unrecompensed. Thus, the extension of forgiveness from one
individual to another takes place only insofar as the former can rightfully invite the
transgressor to remain as a fellow citizen,10 demonstrating neither the unwarranted favor of
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a paternal authority nor the pretense of an upstart servant and, thus, displaying the true
equality of political peers.
We are left, then, to inquire into those kinds of relationships that ensure the
identities of humans are formed and known and that these individuals, inasmuch as they
have announced their identities, relate to one another within an egalitarian framework. The
resulting political community – whatever else we may call it – will be shown,
consequently, to be the proper “location” for freedom. Furthermore, should we be
successful in this endeavor, we will also be able to see how this “space” for freedom,
defined by the conditions for freedom’s emergence, is distinguished from and counteracts
the effects of other categories of activity, such as consumerist society. In keeping with the
suggestions of various contemporary scholars, I will suggest that “civil society” is an apt
term for this community of free citizens.11 Incidentally, modern political philosophy has
presented the West with many diverging depictions of “civil society,” ranging from the
governments of the social contract tradition based upon the security of individuals to
Hegel’s amalgamation of corporations and law enforcement. Here, I will be utilizing the
work of Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato in Civil Society and Political Theory to clarify my
own concept. However, Cohen and Arato choose to include the nuclear family within their
definition, a move I find inconsistent and deleterious in light of the effort to describe an
intersubjective freedom of anti-consumerist character. Therefore, I will offer a brief
criticism of Cohen and Arato’s work on this point, defending the unique relationship
between political citizenship and the experience of freedom.
In order to properly define a realm of human activity – that is, in order to remain
consistent with our discussion in Part II, Section I – we will have to posit a particular way
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actions can be described in terms of their appearing purpose. Thus, in the attempt to
develop “civil society” as a collective concept of those human interactions that are
fundamentally free, a descriptive, purpose-oriented definition that takes into account the
preceding discussion of promises and forgiveness must be formulated. This implies that,
whatever else we might say, civil society consists of those words and deeds that, through
their appearance, establish the identities of individuals, facilitating interaction amongst
them that is befitting of equal citizens. Or, to put it differently, we could claim that the
realm of civil society bounds human activity that, through its intersubjective appearance,
works towards the connection of individuals in an egalitarian network, a community of
individuals within which the participation of those individuals is viewed as inherently
valuable. When using the term “civil society,” then, we must exclude all activities in which
the actor is made to be a functional cog in a machine that monopolizes value, for identities
cannot be formed if individuals are not given the opportunity to announce themselves as
independent, irreplaceable selves within a community of other such selves.
Consequently, given the consumerist character of most contemporary economic
institutions, one must sharply distinguish civil society from profit-oriented firms. To the
extent that profit is viewed as the overarching end for a particular organization, members
of that organization are (as previously demonstrated) reduced to merely functional
components. Additionally, insofar as “economic” refers to efforts directed towards the
satisfaction of private needs and desires, in keeping with its etymological root,12 we must
exclude the whole of “economics” from civil society, for acts that are primarily dedicated
to the satiation of physical impulses are inherently distinct from the deeds of publicly
identified citizens. Whenever we commit ourselves to alleviating the pangs of hunger or
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the drowsiness of sleep deprivation we are constraining ourselves, at the same time, to the
anonymous and functional nature of biological cycles, acting in ways wholly incompatible
with the political interactions of freedom.
This is very much in keeping with the thoughts of Alexis de Tocqueville, whose
observations of the “spirit of association” in America led him to conclude that such civil
activity was inherently linked to the health of a democracy.13 He found that individuals
who were consistently active in the “public affairs” of their local community were required
to “turn from the circle of their private interests and occasionally tear themselves away
from self-absorption.”14 Linking de Tocqueville’s 19th-century conclusions with
contemporary political theory, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato have constructed the
following definition of civil society: “a sphere of social interaction between economy and
state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of
associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public
communication.”15 For Cohen and Arato, this means that the discursive, egalitarian, and
pluralistic components of human activity are primary in any discussion of civil society. In
so doing, they draw upon the work of Jügen Habermas and distinguish themselves from the
social contract tradition and classical liberalism, moving away from the all-too-common
presumption in modern political theory that the atomic individual is fundamental in the
analysis of political phenomena.16 However, rejecting the naturally isolated individual of
classical liberalism does not necessarily mean that the notion of persons as individuals
disappears. Rather, as I have been suggesting and as Cohen and Arato imply with their
emphasis on political pluralism, the description of a community-oriented context within
which persons form individual identities through their interactions preserves the possibility
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of individuality while still elevating the importance of intersubjective appearance as a
condition for politics.
That being said, there are some problematic inconsistencies that arise within Cohen
and Arato’s “operational definition” of civil society that need to be examined and carefully
distinguished from my own claims. First, I struggle to understand why the “intimate
sphere,” composed primarily of the nuclear family, is included as a vital part of a realm
which, above all else, is supposed to be egalitarian and pluralistic. Insofar as both equality
and pluralism refer to the development of public identities by citizens who are granted
equal access and participatory import within a given polity, the prospect of exposing the
members of a family to such public scrutiny from each other seems as destructive as it is
absurd. To be sure, Cohen and Arato would not necessarily accept my use of the concept
“public identity” as a necessary condition for civil interaction, but in order to remain
consistent with our careful definitions of equality and plurality, we must continue to regard
the formation of identities with others as an inherent component of political activity. And,
while a careful discussion of the purpose and functioning of a nuclear family cannot be
included here, I will suggest that, at the very least, the family works towards the security
and physico-emotional well-being of its members. This implies the following crucial point:
The family functions as a single unit, with all members serving functional (but not
necessarily degrading) roles within its auspices. Familial love might maintain that each
member is inherently valuable, thus avoiding the exploitive and patriarchal conditions that
have emerged within family structures throughout human history, but the possibility of
individual identity and equality is negated by the surpassing effort to secure and satisfy
physical needs. Should persons within a family decide to form public identities through
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their interactions with one another, we might say that they must suspend their existence as
a family and create amongst themselves a political community, pushing aside their prior
focus on each others’ physical safety and physico-emotional welfare.
For similar reasons, I find Cohen and Arato’s depiction of mutual exchange
between economic and civil society also unacceptable. For them, civil society serves as a
mediator between the economy and state, meaning that it could somehow, in its effort to
establish pluralistic and community-oriented activities amongst citizens, also take into
account the common effort to produce goods, primarily those which are consumable. In
their words, “the principles of civil society can be brought to bear on economic institutions
within what we call economic society.”17 Yet, in light of the various conclusions drawn
thus far concerning the incompatibility of freedom with need-based activity and the
apolitical, functional roles that accompany it, I am at a loss to explain how it is that the
“principles” of civil society – such as pluralism and equality – could be incorporated with
economic activity. This is not to say that economic activity is necessarily degrading,
though our consumerist context presents innumerable examples that seemingly serve as
substantial evidence for such a claim, but rather, my point is simply this: if we wish to
maintain a notion of civil society that is grounded in the appearance of citizens through
their public identities, and if civil society promotes the experience of freedom through
pluralistic and egalitarian speech and action, then we cannot, at the same time, claim that
the core tenets of this kind of human activity can be “brought to bear” on economics. We
must insist on the unique role of civil interaction, lest we give sway to the alreadydominant tendency to view human action in economic and/or consumerist terms.
II
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- INCORPORATING CIVIL SOCIETY into ARENDT’S FRAMEWORK The complexity and variegated nature of Arendt’s political writings makes it
difficult, at first attempt, to understand how a concept that appears foreign to her writings –
civil society – can be included as a vital component of her political theory. Yet, it is on the
demonstration of this claim that the entirety of my project hinges, and so, in the following
paragraphs, I will first respond to naysayers such as Cohen and Arato who interpret
Arendt’s critique of the social realm as an outright admonition of all things social,
including civil society and, in doing so, equivocate between her definition of the social
realm and their own elucidation of civil society. Next, I will utilize Arendt’s work in On
Revolution to differentiate her great appreciation, both practical and theoretical, for local,
“social” forms of political engagement from her strong opposition to the social realm as an
anti-political form of activity, basing this distinction in my construal of her conception of
freedom. We should not make the mistake of assuming that civil society, as a localized,
accessible mode of polity-formation, is by its nature “social” in Arendt’s sense of the term;
neither should we hastily conclude that there is nothing “social,” as the word is used in
colloquial discourse, about Arendt’s ideal of politics and freedom. Thus, I will conclude by
depicting what I take to be an Arendtian civil society, purposed not only towards the
establishment of freedom but also towards its restoration in an increasingly consumerist,
depoliticizing culture such as ours.
The thesis that a Tocquevillian conceptualization of civil society ought to be
included within Arendt’s political theory is an ambitious one; a seemingly foolhardy
argument in light of her unswerving criticism of the social realm in the modern age. Cohen
and Arato, for example, suggest that Arendt presents “one of the most challenging, and
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certainly the most passionate, critiques of modern civil society.”18 They find an
insurmountable opposition between her negative portrayal of contemporary society as an
in-between realm of publicly announced private interests and their own analysis of civil
society as a mediating space of community-oriented action between the economic and
public spheres. Furthermore, they claim that Arendt’s understanding of politics is limited
to a “historically specific and unique constellation: the ancient city republic,” and, as such,
maintains the “prejudices of the Greeks.”19 Therefore, they conclude that Arendt’s political
theory is essentially anachronistic, unable to achieve relevance in the modern age due to its
exclusion of modern forms of organization, including so-called “social movements.” Even
Arendt’s acknowledgement of the political import of the mid-19th to mid-20th century labor
movements is dismissed by Cohen and Arato as insular, for they find her discussion on this
point to imply that these political events had no “social and economic interests and
demands.” It is, for them, an “entirely fictitious” retelling of the labor movements’ story.20
While initially compelling, Cohen and Arato’s critical application of Arendt’s
theory to their concept of civil society is fundamentally mistaken, primarily because they
confuse Arendt’s subtle, yet carefully bounded, definition of the social realm with
vernacular uses of the term “society.” Certainly, Arendt describes the “social realm” as
essentially anti-political in character and incapable of fostering freedom, and her reasons
for doing so were explained at length in Part II. There is, however, no justification for
making the further claim that, since Arendt is critical of the implications of the “social
realm” insofar as it is a central concept in her political thought, she also must be critical of
civil society as a localized form of political interaction. Unless Cohen and Arato are
willing to admit that their construal of civil society is compatible with the conformist and
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economic character of Arendt’s social realm, which I highly doubt, they have no basis for
arguing that there exists here an opposition between Arendt’s political theory and their
definition of civil society. Their interpretation of Arendt’s writings is further handicapped
by the strict, literal manner in which they connect her thought with the “historically
specific” political body which emerged in ancient Athens. Having already addressed this
point in Part I, I will refer to Roy Tsao’s insights again only briefly, summarizing them as
follows: Arendt’s treatment of Greek politics is purely instrumental, helping her to
formulate her concepts of citizenship, freedom, and political action but leaving her theory
itself unattached from the particular institutions which made up the Athenian polis. Thus,
Arendt is in no way sympathetic towards Greek “prejudices,” contrary to Cohen and
Arato’s claims, especially those that encouraged discrimination against women and the
pretentious avoidance of oikos affairs.21
Finally, Cohen and Arato’s dismissal of Arendt’s discussion of the worker’s
movement is unfair and misleading, supporting their overall depiction of Arendt’s theory
as outmoded, irrelevant, and exclusive of civil society. Arendt does not pretend as though
labor unions had no social and/or economic interests, and she finds them politically
significant not because she abstracted them from their socio-economic context but rather
because they represented to her an actual case in which individuals, on behalf of the
injustice and inequality they faced as underprivileged jobholders, organized as citizens,
making their economic activity “incidental” to their political action.22 What we find, then,
is that Arendt’s political writings, far from being anachronistic, are surprisingly prescient,
for they are explicitly open to diverse forms of genuine political action, even those which
are labeled “social” by many.
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We must clearly distinguish, then, those forms of political interaction that are
commonly termed “social” because of their localized, accessible, and communal character
from the anti-political activities of Arendt’s “social realm” so we can understand how it is
that her theory is inclusive of civil society. There is an unmistakable difference between
the description of deeds that are public (i.e. publicly appearing) reflections of the “two-part
functionality” of the household,23 either through their economic usefulness and/or their
conformity to society’s norms, and an account of the formation of polities rooted in local
communities and the challenges faced by members of those communities. “Social” in the
former sense is certainly anti-political and not only incapable of facilitating but also hostile
towards the experience of freedom, and it is justifiably criticized as such by Arendt.
However, if we accept that the latter mode of human activity is also social, not according
to Arendt’s particular definition of the term, but because of the relative closeness and
familiarity of its personalities, issues, and realm of influence in relation to its members,
then we are well on our way towards understanding the necessarily social character of
Arendtian politics.
Consider the following example, given by Arendt in a 1946 letter to Karl Jaspers,
of what she considered to be an authentic example of political action:
“[An American family in New England] and many of their friends wrote
immediately and spontaneously to their congressmen, insisted on the constitutional
rights of all Americans regardless of national background, and declared that if
something like [the Japanese internment camps] could happen, they no longer felt
safe themselves.”24
This nostalgically simple yet powerful act of political concern is contrasted by Arendt,
with regrettable irony, to the “social” oppression of African Americans via the norms and
legal institutions that reduced them to something less than the level of humanity Whites
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thought themselves worthy to enjoy.25 The crucial point, for us, is this: Arendt herself was
well aware of the distinction between the destructive and anti-political nature of the “social
realm” and the ways in which community-oriented, “sociable” polities act as loci of
freedom. The sociability of the “American family in New England” towards their friends
was a vital component of their ability to gather them together and jointly write letters to
their legislative representatives. Without such hospitality the persons involved likely would
have been reluctant to engage in the sort of political discourse and action necessary to
achieve the task at hand. Thus, the “social” character of civil society – that is, those aspects
that contribute toward an accessible and welcoming environment – provides the relational
safety-net necessary for many persons to become willing to form public identities with
others. Without this reassurance of locality and hospitality, the vast majority of individuals
simply would not have access to a forum within which they could discover their potential
for citizenship. And, once the process of creating public identities is initiated, it follows
that the interactions of individuals will begin exhibiting an authentic, shared experience of
freedom.
This argument is substantially bolstered by Arendt’s discussion of Thomas
Jefferson’s notion of “little republics” – a ward system, within which “‘every man in the
State’ could become ‘an acting member of the Common government.’”26 Arendt finds that,
in light of the recent concentration of governmental power in impersonal bureaucratic
structures and elite state institutions, this notion of localized forms of political activity
represents the sole possibility of freedom for most individuals in the modern world. In preRevolutionary America, the existence of townships, within which citizens would meet as
members of localities, provided a model for Jefferson’s vision of a subdivided republic.
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Arendt suggests that Jefferson, understanding the implications of institutionalizing legal
authority in a strong, federal government, feared the widespread disengagement of citizens
and thus proposed his scheme of “little republics” to serve the purpose of making the
public space of America “present” to each citizen. Thus, here we see Arendt explicitly
linking the concept of accessibility with her formulation of freedom as a public reality; in
agreement with Jefferson’s assessment of America, she claims that “no one could be called
free without his experience in public freedom … no one could be called either happy or
free without participating, and having a share, in public power.”27 She draws parallel
conclusions concerning the role of council systems in revolutionary Europe, which
“obviously, were spaces of freedom”28 insofar as they presented individuals with the
opportunity to meet with one another at a local level and on behalf of jointly-determined
public interests.
Implicit to Arendt’s analysis of localized, accessible forms of politics is her belief
(stated later in On Revolution29) that the development of freedom demands equal
accessibility to political assemblies, a claim also congruent with our previous consideration
of the implications of intersubjective freedom. For Arendt, if a polity is to establish
interactions worthy of the label “freedom” amongst its citizens, it necessarily must not be
the case that some citizens are afforded a lion’s share of public interaction while others are
left without any opportunities for political appearance. This requires, accordingly, that
individuals be presented with the opportunity to meet with one another as citizens at a local
level; otherwise, politics is quarantined to institutions designated for participation by an
elite alone. If political interaction is isolated to such forums that are accessible only to a
privileged few, to those who are deemed politicians or statesmen because they are able
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and/or have been chosen to relocate themselves and devote their time to public business,
then the experience of freedom is isolated to these individuals’ interactions and, eventually,
entirely disappears.
That is to say, by reducing the number of individuals who engage in public affairs
to a select few representatives, and by expecting these individuals to act not only as
citizens but also as the collective voice of their respective constituencies, we leave these
public officials with an irresolvable dilemma: they must either 1) discover their own
unique and individual public identity and, in doing so, likely disregard the opinions of
those who sent them, or 2) continually attempt to give voice to the concerns and interests
of their constituency and, in making this commitment, never fully pursue the discovery of
their own identity. In the former case, freedom is generated amongst so-called
“representatives” but only if these individuals are willing to sacrifice their duty to represent the desires of those to whom they promised (at least implicitly) such
representation. Yet, should this duty be maintained fully, as in the latter option, neither
representatives nor the members of their constituencies are capable of forming public
identities and, therefore, freedom becomes a façade for the negotiations that take place
between members of the political elite. Though these individuals seem to be engaging in
the sorts of activities compatible with the experience of freedom, they are never directing
their words and deeds towards the articulation of their unique, appearing personalities.
Instead, they simply are bringing forth whatever issues are deemed necessary to sustain the
support of those who legitimize their political participation. “The trouble, in other words,
is that politics has become a profession and a career,” a problem which stems from “the
lack of public spaces to which the people at large would have entrance.”30
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Civil society, then, is not merely a more friendly approach to politics, but is itself a
necessary component in the effort to preserve Arendtian freedom for both citizens “at
large” in a modern democracy and their elected representatives. By expanding the reach of
public assemblies through the formation of “social” associations that act on behalf of
locally-determined issues and efforts, freedom is made real both to the vast majority of
individuals through their voluntary participation in such civil-social organizations and to
elected members of government, who are then relieved of the impossible burden of
embodying the totality of political voices within their respective constituencies. By
allowing for public space to emerge between persons acting in concert, through activities
as simple as writing letters to members of Congress and in venues as “social” as one’s own
home, we acknowledge that the formation of public identities is a real possibility for all
individuals. Accordingly, we recognize that the experience of freedom is an ever-present
reality, should persons choose to partake in it. So long as the purpose of a public gathering
is directed towards the identification of each of its members through their speaking and
acting on behalf of their community, the realization of freedom is immanent.
From here, furthermore, we can see how an Arendtian civil society, through its
fulfillment of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the making of promises and the
offering of forgiveness, counteracts the devastating effects of consumerism. The
experience of freedom depends upon the willingness of political actors to promise to one
another that they will, in all future endeavors, remain consistent with their appearing
identity and to forgive by inviting one another to remain co-citizens even when the
consistency implied by their promises is compromised. Civil society facilitates freedom,
then, through its widespread accessibility and emphasis on pluralistic equality, making it
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possible for individuals to know each other in such a way that they can make promises and
extend forgiveness. That is to say, civil society creates a public network that is available
and stable enough for the sustenance of freedom. And, if we accept that the uniquely
destructive aspect of consumerist society is that, through its natural spread into all arenas
of human life, it seeks to turn all human activity into purely functional deeds, transforming
humans into anonymous functionaries for its continual advance, then the remedy offered
by civil society is found in those very same characteristics deemed to represent the
possibility for promises and forgiveness. For, by demanding that individuals form
identities through their public appearance to one another and requiring that these individual
appearances be viewed as equally and inherently significant, it is as though we forcefully
wedge a steel rod in-between the smoothly spinning gears of consumerism’s mechanical
growth. We abruptly wake the members of consumerist society out of their functional
stupor and present them with the possibility for a meaningful, freeing existence. Thus,
consumerism cannot gain influence wherever individuals act as genuine citizens, for
members of a polity whom are known by one another and treated with equal respect are
necessarily liberated from functional degradation and, as a result, free to jointly create and
sustain their polity.
This, then, is the promise of civil society for our day and age: that through the
deliberate creation of polities amongst ourselves, at a local, accessible, and “social” level,
we will discover a mode of activity which will remove us from the functionality and
expendability inherent to consumerism’s expansion. We will be enabled to identify one
another as equals, co-citizens with whom we can discover and experience genuine
freedom. Should we view Arendt’s work in light of this concept of civil society, we will
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see, in my estimation, a coherent and relevant interpretation of her understanding of the
relationship between political action and freedom, one that is increasingly significant
within our socio-political context.31 She discerned vital connections between the unique
way of life developed in the polis of ancient Athenians, the “public happiness” enjoyed by
politically-active individuals in pre-Revolutionary America, and the “spaces of freedom”
created by the European revolutionary councils, encapsulating their significance with the
term freedom. My sincere hope, then, is that we will carry her work even further by
conceptualizing civil society as the bearer of freedom’s torch in our context, recognizing
that it carries within itself the promise for meaningful living that is naturally, and
justifiably, attributed to humanity’s capacity to be free.
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